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I. INTRODUCTION'
Hungary is in the midst of a fundamental transformation
toward a market economy. Although Hungary has long been in
the forefront of efforts to reform socialism itself, after 1989 the
goals of reform moved from market socialism toward capitalism,
1. While the authors of this Article have attempted to provide the most complete
and current references to the legal provisions discussed herein, due to the nature of the
subject much of the information was collected through personal interviews. Those
interviews are noted wherever possible. The absence of extensive references in a
particular section should thus be attributed to the unavailability of documentation.
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as the old Communist regime lost power and the idea of wide-
spread private ownership gained acceptance. The legal frame-
work-the "rules of the game"-is now being geared toward
encouraging, protecting, and rewarding entrepreneurs in the pri-
vate sector.
This Article describes the evolving legal framework in Hungary
in several areas: constitutional, real property, intellectual prop-
erty, company, foreign investment, contract, bankruptcy, and
antimonopoly law.2 These areas of law serve to define: (1) prop-
erty rights; (2) the means to exchange these rights; and (3) the
rules for competitive market behavior. Together they form the
bedrock of a legal system for a market economy.3 This Article
then addresses the capacity of Hungary's current legal institu-
tions to implement the new legal reforms. As in the other coun-
tries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), defining real property
rights and creating the conditions for free and fair competition
are perhaps the most contentious and confused areas in the cur-
rent legal landscape, largely because they tread so heavily on
existing vested interests. Other areas of law, including intellec-
tual property, company, foreign investment, and contract law, are
less problematic.
2. This Article is part of a larger research project sponsored by the Policy
Research Department and the Legal Department of the World Bank to study evolving
legal frameworks in Eastern Europe. Other studies include: CHERYL W. GRAY ET AL.,
EVOLVING LEGAL FRAMEWORKS FOR PRIVATE SECTOR DEVELOPMENT IN CENTRAL AND EAST-
ERN EUROPE (World Bank Policy Research Working Paper Series No. WPS209, July
1993); Cheryl W. Gray, The Legal Framework for Private Sector Activity in the Czech Republic,
26 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. (forthcoming Summer 1993) [hereinafter Gray, Czech Repub-
lic]; Cheryl W. Gray & Peter Ianachkov, Bulgaria's Evolving Legal Framework for Private
Sector Development, 27 INT'L LAW. (forthcoming Winter 1993); Cheryl W. Gray & Franjo D.
Stiblar, The Evolving Legal Framework for Private Sector Activity in Slovenia, 14 U. PA. J. INT'L
Bus. L. (forthcoming Spring 1993); Cheryl W. Gray et al., The Legal Framework for Private
Sector Development in a Transitional Economy: The Case of Poland, 22 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
283 (1992) [hereinafter Gray et al., Poland]; Cheryl W. Gray et al., Romania's Evolving
Legal Framework for Private Sector Development, 7 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 617 (1992)
[hereinafter Gray et al., Romania].
3. This Article does not discuss certain other areas of law that are also important
to the private sector, such as privatization, banking, taxation, and labor law. Although a
critical area of reform, privatization is a transitional issue; this Article seeks to address
the long-term legal structure. The other areas of law are omitted due to space limita-
tions as well as likely coverage in future World Bank or external studies.
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-II. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW4
No written constitution existed in Hungary before 1949.5
Rather, similar to the tradition in England, constitutional princi-
ples were derived from various pieces of legislation.6 In Act XX
of 1949, 7 the People's Republic of Hungary adopted a constitu-
tion based in part on the Soviet model.8 Under this Constitution,
the Hungarian economy was based on the concept of social own-
ership of the means of production, a vague notion akin to, but
not identical to, state ownership. 9 The 1949 Constitution also
established the primacy of the national economic plan in guiding
the economy.10 Not only did state planning control the economy
in this and other socialist countries, but. by virtue of appearing in
the fundamental law," it governed the entire legal culture of the
country as well.
In 1972, the Constitution underwent extensive amendment to
accommodate the New Economic Mechanism of 1968.12 For
4. The various versions of the Hungarian Constitution are interrelated and
complex. For a brief and comprehensible overview of these amendments, see Gisbert
H. Flanz, Hungary, in CONSTrrUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD v, v-viii (Albert P.
Blaustein & Gisbert H. Flanz eds. & Marta Kiszely trans., 1990); Gabor Hamza, The
Republic of Hungary Commentary (1976-1990), in CoNsTITurIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE
WORLD ix, ix-x (Albert P. Blaustein & Gisbert H. Flanz eds. & Marta Kiszely trans.,
1990).
5. See Istvn Kovcs, Hungary, in 1 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE
LAw H-13, H-18 to H-19 (Viktor Knapp ed., 1978).
6. See id. (collecting major acts from 1222 to 1949).
7. This Act is actually the Hungarian Constitution. See A MAGYAR K6ZTRSASG
ALKOTMNY [1949 Constitution] (Hungary), translated in CONSTrrrIONS OF THE COUN-
TRIES OF THE WORLD (Albert P. Blaustein & Gisbert H. Flanz eds. & Marta Kiszely trans.,
1990). The Constitution was subsequently amended several times for various reasons.
However, instead of adopting an entirely new Constitution, Parliament chose to use leg-
islative amendments instead. See Hamza, supra note 4, at ix. The substance of these
amendments is not critical to the analysis in this Article.
8. See A MAGYAR K6ZTRSASG ALKOTMNY [1957 Constitution] pmbl. (Hungary),
translated in 3 CONSTrTUTIONs OF NATIONS 432 (Amos J. Peaslee ed., 1968).
9. Id. § II, art. 6. The 1957 Constitution states that many public resources, such as
forests and mines, as well as many services, such as telephones and banks, "are the
property of the state and of public bodies as trustees for the whole people." Id. (emphasis
added).
10. Id. § II, art. 5. "The economic life of the Hungarian People's Republic is deter-
mined by a state national-economic plan." Id.
11. Id. § XI, art. 71(1).
12. See Hamza, supra note 4, at ix. The New Economic Mechanism was Hungary's
first major attempt at economic reform. It maintained national planning but ended the
practice of imposing production targets on state-owned enterprises. Rather, a system of
economic regulations and incentives-taxes, prices, and credit policy-was designed to
induce firms to meet national planning targets. This experiment was popularly known
as goulash communism. Most of the lessons of that period, however, were negative, as
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example, the Constitution for the first time recognized and pro-
tected the economic activities of small-scale private producers of
commodities,' 3 as well as private property.' 4 Protection of the
latter, however, always had been balanced against the needs of
the public interest,' which in practice left great discretion to the
state in regulating both state-owned and private business.
On October 18, 1989, the Hungarian Parliament passed the
most significant constitutional revisions to date. This amend-
ment is often referred to as the "new" Hungarian Constitution,
since approximately eighty percent of the 1949 version was abro-
gated.' 6 Drafted on the threshold of Hungary's democratic and
economic reforms, the amendment was a political compromise
between the old-school communists and the new generation of
politicians who were gradually replacing them. It is unclear how
long this version of the Constitution will remain in force; while
its preamble envisions it as a "transition" document,' 7 no further
fundamental revision is anticipated in the near future.
The current Hungarian Constitution is composed of seventy-
eight sections that fall within fifteen different chapters:
I. General Provisions
II. The Parliament
III. The President of the Republic
IV. The Constitutional Court
V. The Parliamentary Commissioner of Citizens' Rights
VI. The State Audit Office
VII. The Council of Ministers
VIII. The Armed Forces and the Police
IX. The Councils
decentralization led to over-investment. In addition, the lack of fiscal discipline exacer-
bated macroeconomic imbalances without significantly increasing efficiency. See Jnos
Kornai, The Hungarian Reform Process: Visions, Hopes, and Reality, 24 J. EcON. LITERATURE
1687 (1986); see also ALAN H. GELB & CHERYL W. GRAY, THE TRANSFORMATION OF EcON-
OMIES IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE: ISSUES, PROGRESS, AND PROSPECTS (The World
Bank Policy and Research Series No. 17, 1991); Andrs Saj6, Diffuse Rights in Search of an
Agent: A Property Rights Analysis of the Firm in the Socialist Market Economy, 10 INT'L REV. L. &
EcON. 41 (1990).
13. MAGYAR K6ZTRSASG ALKOTMNY [1972 Constitution] ch. I, § 12(1) (Hungary),
translated in CONSTITTrrIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD (Albert P. Blaustein &
Gisbert H. Flanz eds. & Marta Kiszely trans., 1990).
14. Id. ch. I, § 13 (protecting individual property owners against expropriation of
their property, except in limited cases).
15. Id. ("Expropriation of property shall be permitted only in exceptional cases and
in the benefit of the general public .... ") (emphasis added).
16. A MAGYAR KoZTRSASG ALKOTMNY [1989 Constitution] (Hungary), translated in
CoNSTrTTIoNS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD (Albert P. Blaustein & Gisbert H.
Flanz eds. & Marta Kiszely trans., 1990).
17. Id. pmbl.
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X. The Judiciary
XI. The Office of the Public Prosecutor
XII. Fundamental Rights and Duties of Citizens
XIII. The Fundamental Principles of the Elections
XIV. The Capital and the National Symbols of the Republic of
Hungary
XV. Closing Provisions' 8
A. Rights and Duties of Citizens
Much of the current Hungarian Constitution deals with the
rights and duties of citizens. Chapter I deems Hungary a demo-
cratic constitutional state,' 9 and asserts its commitment to a mar-
ket economy,2 0 as well as its encouragement of entrepreneurship
and competition.2' Chapter I also establishes protection of pri-
vate property, including compensation in the event of expropria-
tion 22 and general rights to freedom of association. 23 Most of the
fundamental rights and duties of citizens are contained in Chap-
ter XII and include the right to liberty, 24 freedom from torture,25
and personal safety.2 6 Freedom of thought,2 7 speech,2 8 reli-
gion,2 9 and the press 30 are also guaranteed. These latter rights,
as well as the right to compensation in the event of expropria-
tion, were also guaranteed by Hungary's socialist Constitution;3'
however, they were always subject to the higher interests of
socialism.
Other sections of the new Constitution promise and protect
certain economic rights. Labor is guaranteed by ensuring "the
right to work, to free choice of employment and profession" 32
and to have "remuneration/wages adequate to the quality and
18. Id. chs. I-XV.
19. Id. ch. I, §§ 1-2.
20. Id. ch. I, § 9(1).
21. Id. ch. I, § 9(2).
22. Id. ch. I, § 13.
23. See id. ch. I, § 3(1) ("In the Republic of Hungary political parties may be formed
freely and may function freely.").
24. Id. ch. XII, §§ 55(1), 58(1).
25. Id. ch. XII, § 54(2).
26. Id. ch. XII, §§ 54(1), 70/D.
27. Id. ch. XII, § 60(1).
28. Id. ch. XII, § 61(1) (protecting the "freedom of opinion").
29. Id. ch. XII, § 60(1)-(3)
30. Id. ch. XII, § 61(2).
31. See 1957 Constitution, supra note 8, § VIII, art. 55(1) (protecting the freedoms
of speech, press, and assembly).
32. 1989 Constitution, supra note 16, ch. XII, § 70/B(I).
[Vol. 26
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quantity of his or her work." 33 Every woman is guaranteed pre-
and post-natal care,3 4 and children are guaranteed the right to
have "special care and assistance on the part of his or her family,
the State and the society, which is necessary to his or her appro-
priate physical, spiritual and moral development. " 35 No matter
how laudable in intent these goals are, however, the broad lan-
guage of these rights may create societal expectations that Hun-
gary is unable to fulfill.
B. Structure of Government
The new Constitution declares that Hungary is a democratic
constitutional state,3 6 based on the separation of powers among
Parliament, the Council of Ministers, and the judiciary. 37 This is
a radical change from the previous system, in which absolute and
undivided power was vested in the Communist Party.
The unicameral Parliament has 386 members, each elected to a
four-year term.38 Its primary legislative duty is to pass laws and
constitutional amendments. 39 Any legislation affecting the fun-
damental rights of citizens must take the form of a constitutional
act. In light of past practice in socialist Hungary, in which Parlia-
ment was relatively inactive and the Council of Ministers gov-
erned by passing decrees, Parliament's renewed lawmaking
responsibility is meant to ensure that this democratically elected
body actually governs the citizenry. 40
Parliament is also responsible for electing Hungary's highest
ranking officials, including the President, the Council of Minis-
ters, the members of the Constitutional Court, the Parliamentary
Commissioners of Citizens' Rights, the President and Vice-Presi-
dent of the State Audit Office, the President of the Supreme
33. Id. ch. XII, § 70/B(3).
34. Id. ch. XII, § 66(2).
35. Id. ch. XII, § 67(1).
36. Id. ch. I, § 2(1).
37. Although the Constitution does not expressly state this notion of a separation
of powers, the structure of the document itself implies such a separation.
38. 1989 Constitution, supra note 16, § 20. The current Parliament was elected in
1990 based on the negotiations embodied in Act XXXIV of 1989 on the Election of
Members of Parliament (MP). Rules governing MP status, including immunities, are
governed by Act IV of 1990 on the Legal Status of Members of Parliament.
39. 1989 Constitution, supra note 16, ch. II, § 19(3)(a)-(b).
40. In enforcing this Parliamentary primacy, the Constitutional Court has several
times overruled decrees by the Council of Ministers on the ground that either the decree
conflicts with a law or that the subject of the decree falls within an area that can only be
addressed by Parliament through the passage of legislation.
1992] 299
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Court, and theChief Public Prosecutor. 4'
A member of Parliament, the President, or the Council of Min-
isters may propose legislation. 42 After any proposal is passed by
Parliament, it must be signed by the President within fifteen days
of receipt to become law.43 In addition, if the President believes
that a provision of. an act of Parliament is unconstitutional,
he may submit questions about the provision to the Constitu-
tional Court.44 While the precise boundaries of the presidential
power to veto executive decisions of the government remain
unclear, the president has, in general, much less power than the
presidents of neighboring countries such as Poland or
Czechoslovakia.
C. The Constitutional Court
The new Constitution also establishes Hungary's first Consti-
tutional Court,45 which is distinct from Hungary's Supreme
Court.46 The Constitutional Court is composed of fifteen judges
who are elected by Parliament. 47 Each judge sits for a nine-year
term, which may be renewed once. These judges are prohibited
from political activity and party membership, 4 a restriction that
applies to local and county judges as well.49 The Court's purpose
is to interpret the constitutionality of legal rules, including inter-
national agreements, and to annul parliamentary acts and other
regulations that it finds unconstitutional. 50 The Court may also
41. See 1989 Constitution, supra note 16, ch. II, § 19(3)(k).
42. Id. ch. II, § 25(1).
43. Id. ch. II, § 26(1).
44. Id. ch. II, § 26(4).
45. Act I of 1989 establishes the Constitutional Court. See 1989 Constitution, supra
note 16, ch. IV. Its purposes are detailed in Act XXXI of 1989, and detailed regulations
on structures and procedures are set out in Act XXXII of 1989.
46. See infra notes 363-372 and accompanying text.
47. 1989 Constitution, supra note 16, ch. IV, § 32/A(4).
48. Id. ch. IV, § 32/A(5).
49. Id. ch. X, § 50(3).
50. Id. ch. IV, § 32/A(1)-(2). The Court's power to annul laws and regulations is
very strong relative to the powers of other constitutional courts in the region. For exam-
ple, the decisions of the Romanian and Polish constitutional courts can be overturned by
a two-thirds vote of their respective parliaments. See Gray et al., Poland, supra note 2, at
322. In contrast, the Hungarian Parliament may not overturn a decision of the Constitu-
tional Court except by amending the Constitution.
At present, regular courts, including the Supreme Court, are not allowed to declare an
act or regulation unconstitutional, although they may stay a case and refer the matter to
the Constitutional Court. There are discussions to amend this procedure so that regular




review draft laws before they are put to a vote by Parliament. 51
Members of Parliament, however, have on occasion accused the
Court of using this power of review to impinge on Parliament's
legislative authority52 Consequently, the Court has declined to
rule on some draft laws to avoid violating, at least in appearance,
the principle of separation of powers. 53
The Hungarian Constitutional Court has extremely broad
jurisdiction, perhaps the broadest of any constitutional court in
the world. Valid complaints in the Court are not limited to those
contesting the constitutionality of existing laws and administra-
tive regulations, but extend to allegations of "negligence"
against the legislature for failing to pass a law, if the absence of
such a law creates an unconstitutional situation.54 If the Court
agrees that lawmakers should have passed such a law, Parliament
is given a limited period of time in which to pass the missing leg-
islation, although the procedure for enforcing this time limit is
unclear. 55
One example of the Court's proactive role was its request, in
January 1990, that Parliament set up an administrative court sys-
tem by April 1, 1991.56 In fact, the need for an administrative
court system arose in part as a result of the Constitutional
Court's ruling that statutorily raising interest rates on housing
loans was unconstitutional because such statutes needed to be
passed by a two-thirds Parliamentary majority rather than a sim-
ple majority. 57 This ruling stimulated petitions on a wide variety
of economic problems not at all related to the Court's role as
guardian of the Constitution.58 The Court determined that an
administrative court system was necessary to handle these eco-
nomic cases.5 9 Parliament failed to establish such a system, but a
crisis was averted because the regular courts decided to take on
such administrative cases.
51. 1989 Constitution, supra note 16, ch. IV, § 32/A(1) (stating that the Constitu-
tional Court "supervises the constitutionality of the laws").
52. Edith Oltay, The PostcommunistJudiciary, REP. E. EUR., Oct. 11, 1991, at 15, 18.
53. Id.
54. Judith Pataki, The Constitutional Court's Search for Identity, REP. E. EUR., June 21,
1991, at 5, 7. However, the Court has interpreted its jurisdiction to hear such omission
cases to be limited to those situations where the missing regulation is affirmatively
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In addition to the Constitutional Court's broad jurisdiction, it
is also extremely accessible. Under the Constitution, any citizen
is entitled to present a complaint to the Court.60 The liberal
rules of open access and permissible claims have led to a virtual
flood of cases. 6' In 1990, the Court received over 1500 petitions
for constitutional review of laws, regulations, and administrative
decisions; it was only able to rule on 235 cases. 62 In 1991, 1600
petitions were filed in the first seven months alone, of which only
about 300 were to be decided for the entire year.
63
Finally, since the Constitutional Court began functioning, it
has used its authority forty-seven times to annul laws and regula-
tions. 64 One landmark decision, for example, declared the origi-
nal Compensation Act unconstitutional because it unfairly
discriminated in favor of former landowners and against owners
of other types of assets. 65 In another significant decision, the
Court declared the prohibition on foreign ownership of land
unconstitutional. These decisions illustrate that the Constitu-
tional Court is an important and powerful institution in Hungary,
and its activities can have a major impact on private sector
development.
III. RIGHTS TO REAL PROPERTY
In Hungary, as in other CEE countries, clarifying real property
rights is perhaps the most difficult and slow-moving area of legal
reform. It not only confronts the vested interests of former own-
ers, existing users, and newly emerging business interests, but it
also must be carried out in a setting plagued by poor records,
struggling institutions, and a legacy of distorted public policies.
60. 1989 Constitution, supra note 16, ch. IV, § 32/A(3). Plans to limit this access by
requiring the litigant to have a direct interest are under active consideration. Other
countries often restrict access to constitutional courts. For example, the U.S. Supreme
Court has held that in order for a litigant to invoke the power of a federal court, the
case-or-controversy requirement of article III of the Constitution requires that they be
directly affected by the challenged legislation. In other words, one must have standing
to sue. See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750-51 (1984). Moreover, review by the
U.S. Supreme Court is discretionary. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1254, 1257 (1988).




65. See Pataki, supra note 54, at 8.
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A. Defining Basic Ownership Rights
1. Socialist Ownership
Apart from the Hungarian Constitution, which provides gen-
eral concepts of property, the most important law in defining
fundamental property relations in Hungary over the past thirty
years has been the Hungarian Civil Code of 1959, as amended. 66
Prior to 1959, a mixture of numerous laws, collected "customs of
judgement," and some decisions of higher courts governed prop-
erty rights.67 The 1959 draft of the Code consolidated these vari-
ous sources of law. Although modeled after the German Civil
Code,68 the Hungarian Code was drafted during the socialist
period and thus reflected socialist ideology, particularly the sec-
tions on property ownership.
A common element of socialist law throughout Central and
Eastern Europe was the recognition of several categories and
concepts of property, including social and cooperative owner-
ship, personal property, and private property. In Hungary, these
categories and their accompanying rights were set out in Part III
of the Civil Code.69 Assets under "social" ownership included
property specifically owned by the state, 70 capital equipment, and
other property of "crucial importance for the national econ-
omy." 7' Property under socialist ownership enjoyed greater
legal protection than the other forms of property. For example,
all Hungarian citizens were obliged to protect state assets, 72 and
the Civil Code promised compensation for losses, injury, and
death resulting from this duty. 73
Similar to "social" property was "cooperative" property.
When almost all of Hungary's land was nationalized during the
66. 1959. 6vi IV. T6rv6ny a Magyar Koztrsasg Polgri Torv~nykonyvir6l [Act IV of
1959 on the Civil Code of the Republic of Hungary], Hatlyos magyar jogszablyok, Nov.
15, 1990, translated in I./Nr. 21-24. HUNGARIAN RULES OF LAW IN FORCE 1227 (1990)
[hereinafter Civil Code].
67. See Istvan Molnar, A Survey of Hungarian Property Law 6 (undated) (unpub-
lished manuscript, on file with The George Washington Journal of International Law and
Economics).
68. See id.
69. Id.; see also 1957 Constitution, supra note 8, § II, art. 6.
70. This refers to property set out in both the Civil Code and the 1957 Constitu-
tion, such as: oil and mineral resources, lakes, rivers and riverbeds, railways, banks, the
postal service, and the telephone, radio, and television networks. See 1957 Constitution,
supra note 8, § II, art. 6; Civil Code, supra note 66, 172.
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1950s and the 1960s, it became cooperative property. 74 Cooper-
ative property differed from socialist property in that it was the
indivisible property of a "group of citizens voluntarily associated
for social production, distribution or the common meeting of
demands." 75 While cooperative ownership appeared to remain
vested in individuals, ownership rights were still limited. Upon
the winding-up of the cooperative, the property did not revert to
the cooperative's members but continued to be part of the coop-
erative property, managed by countrywide organs representing
the interests of the cooperatives.7 6
"Personal" property was that which served personal needs,
including family houses and apartments, 77 vacation homes, furni-
ture, and personal items such as clothes. 78 These items were by
law and in practice freely transferable. However, entrepreneur-
ship involving personal property was stifled by the prohibition on
commercial trading; all transfers were required to meet only per-
sonal or familial needs. Additionally, separate pieces of legisla-
tion restricted the size and number of properties that individuals
could own. Families were restricted to owning a maximum of
one home-either a house or an apartment- one vacation home,
and one agricultural plot. Families acquiring additional prop-
erty, through, for example, marriage or inheritance, were
required by law to sell the excess.
"Private" property consisted of individually-owned means of
production. While the Civil Code recognized "the private prop-
erty of small producers which serves useful business activity," 79 it
also granted the state power to restrict its use through taxation
or by decree. 80
2. Redefining Ownership Rights
Hungary has taken important steps over the past three years to
74. Gabor Horvath, Hungary: A Heated Row Over Land Reform, Inter Press Service,
Aug. 17, 1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, INPRESS File.
75. Civil Code, supra note 66, 90.
76. See Molnar, supra note 67, at 8-9.
77. Civil Code, supra note 66, 92. Most housing remained in private hands. In
the 1980s, the state only owned approximately 25% of the housing in Hungary. See
HANNA MATRAS, STRUCTURE AND PERFORMANCE OF THE HOUSING SECTOR OF THE CEN-
TRALLY PLANNED ECONOMIES: USSR, HUNGARY, POLAND, GDR AND YUGOSLAVIA 19 (The
World Bank Policy, Planning and Research Staff, Infrastructure and Urban Development
Department Discussion Paper No. INU 53, Oct. 1989).





redefine property rights and to remove the stigma and legal
impediments that had attached to private8' ownership. The new
Constitution and Civil Code have been amended, and many
other laws affecting rights in real property have been adopted.
For example, the newly amended Constitution abolishes the pref-
erential treatment previously afforded to socialist property by
granting private property equal rights and protection.8 2 . More-
over, as noted above, the Constitution guarantees compensation
in the event that private property is expropriated.8 3 The Civil
Code also guarantees adequate compensation for property
expropriated for the public interest.84 Under socialism such
compensation was also guaranteed, but rarely paid. However,
Hungary seems to have expressed a greater willingness to abide
by this fundamental principle by elevating this guarantee from
the Civil Code to the Constitution.
As with the Constitution, the most important property provi-
sions in the Civil Code have been amended. Private ownership is
now fully accepted in Hungary, and the privatization program is
attempting to transfer the bulk of state assets into private
hands.8 5 Law XIV of 1991 abolished all forms of socialist owner-
ship, abrogated privileges of state and cooperative ownership as
against private ownership, reviewed the range of exclusive state
property and inalienable assets, and empowered the state to cede
certain property, such as forests and land, to private owners.
Remnants of the prior system in related Code sections are no
longer enforced and should be interpreted in the spirit of the
recent amendments-a necessary process pending a thorough
overhaul of the Civil Code. Although these outdated provisions
of the Civil Code perhaps could be eliminated by a rapid amend-
ment, as was done in Poland,86 the Hungarians have opted to
undertake a more systematic revision of the Code over the next
several years under the auspices of a special codification commit-
81. Here, "private" property refers to any individually-owned property, as opposed
to the narrower socialist definition of the term.
82. 1989 Constitution, supra note 16, ch. I, § 9(1).
83. Id. ch. I, § 13. This provision is discussed earlier. See supra note 22 and accom-
panying text.
84. Civil Code, supra note 66, 177.
85. See generally RebeccaJ. Hanson, Note, The Legal Framework for Privatization in Hun-
gary, 23 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 441 (1992) (examining Hungary's recent "legal revolu-
tion" by focusing on the Company and Foreign Investment Acts, which form the basis of
privatization; the Transformation Act and its deficiencies; the State Property Agency;
and the Compensation Act).
86. See Gray et al., Poland, supra note 2, at 287-88.
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tee appointed by the Ministry of Justice.8 7
Act I of 1987 on Land,88 as amended through 1991, has been
instrumental in freeing up the private market for real estate.
This act, which covers not only land but also buildings and other
constructions, defines the rights of owners and users and clarifies
conditions for the purchase and sale of real estate.8 9 Although
somewhat unstable in its specifics because of continual amend-
ment,90 this act has served the important function of removing
administrative barriers to private acquisition of real estate. For
example, it has eliminated the "operational administration" form
of land-holding, which was common during socialist times, and
has lifted the former fifty hectare (123 acre) maximum on private
land ownership. 9' A private Hungarian person, either natural or
legal, may now acquire real estate without any legal limitation.
However, other impediments, such as ambiguity to title and
access to credit, continue to retard the development of a private
market for real estate.92
3. Foreign Ownership
Under Act I on Land, foreigners are prohibited from owning
agricultural land, unless ownership is permitted by another law.
Foreigners may, however, own non-agricultural land and immov-
able real property after receiving permission from the Ministry of
Finance. 93 This permission is guided by the discretionary stan-
dard that the purchase may not "harm the Hungarian State or its
autonomy, does not harm local governments, nor cultural and
87. Tams Srkozy, Legal Framework for Reforms in Hungary 1 (1990) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with The George Washington Journal of International Law and Economics).
88. See 1987. 6vi. I t6rvrny a f61drol a vrgrehajtsra kiadott 26/1987. (VII. 30.) MT
6s a 8/1987. (IX. 1.) MEM rendelettel egysrges szerkezetben (kiegrszitve az az6ta
bek6vetkezett vltozsokkal 1990. febr. 14.-vel bezr6lag) [Act I of 1987 The Act of Land,
in uniform pattern with Decree 26/1987 (VII.30) MT by the Council of Ministers and
Decree 8/1987 (IX.I.) MEM by the Minister of Agriculture (complemented with all
amendments from the said time up to February 14, 1990)], Hatlyos magyarjogszablyok,
June 1, 1990, translated in I./Nr. 10. HUNGARIAN RULES OF LAW IN FORCE 547 (1990)
[hereinafter Act I on Land].
89. Id. 2.
90. See Srk6zy, supra note 87, at 3.
91. See Viktor Knapp, Socialist Countries, in VI INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COM-
PARATIVE LAW ch. 2, §§ 79-84 (Frederick H. Lawson ed., 1975) (explaining scope of the
right of "operational administration" under socialist law).
92. See infra notes 98-122 and accompanying text.
93. Act I on Land, supra note 88, 38(1). Foreigners are defined as natural persons
who are not Hungarian citizens, Hungarian citizens domiciled abroad, and business
organizations not created under Hungarian law. An exception for Hungarians domi-
ciled abroad allows them to own property through inheritance.
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touristic interests." 94 Apparently, Hungarian expatriates whose
property was expropriated can secure this permission easily; for-
eigners who buy out their partners in a joint venture may also
obtain favorable judgment.95
In contrast, Hungarian corporate entities that are partly, or
even wholly, foreign-owned are entitled to own real property
under the Foreign Investment Act of 1988.96 The only limitation
on this ownership is that, under section 19, the property must be
related to the company's objectives. 97 The original purpose of
this limitation was to prevent speculative buying by foreigners;
however, real estate development appears to qualify as a proper
business purpose.
B. Assigning and Securing Title
Once basic rights to private property have been defined, the
next step is linking those rights with specific owners. This is the
most controversial aspect of reform, since it raises the possibility
of a redistribution of assets that could decidedly influence the
pattern of wealth for the foreseeable future.
1. Clarification of State Property Ownership
The need to define owners applies to both the public and pri-
vate sectors. On the public side, assigning specific ownership
rights to state-owned property, including property of state enter-
prises, public office buildings, and public housing, to various
levels of government is proving problematic in Hungary, as it was
in several other CEE countries. 98
Two recent laws address this thorny question. First, Act LXV
of 1990 on Local Government transferred control over all state
enterprise property to the State Property Agency.99 This law,
however, has not eliminated disputes among municipalities, dis-
94. New Government Regulations on the Acquisition of Real Estate by Foreigners, INVEST IN
HUNGARY, 1991, at 29. Local governments have the power to veto a sale. See Nelli Tas,
Real Estate Periscope, INVEST IN HUNGARY, 1991, at 29-30 (discussing a recent government
regulation).
95. New Government Regulations on the Acquisition of Real Estate by Foreigners, supra note
94, at 29.
96. See Unified Text of Act XXIV of 1988 Regarding Investments by Non-residents
in Hungary With Subsequent Amendments and Supplements, ch. III, § 19(a), reprinted in
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE Doc. No. PB91-960627 (1991).
97. Id.
98. The problem is particularly acute in Poland, where the move to decentralize
government has been very strong. See Gray et al, Poland, supra note 2, at 288.
99. Srk6zy, supra note 87, at 6.
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tricts, and the State Property Agency as to ownership of enter-
prise-specific property. Second, Act XXXIII of 1991 on the
Transfer of State Property to Local Authorities'00 transferred to
local governments the ownership rights in most other state-
owned real property, including apartments, non-residential units
such as small .shops, and numerous other state-owned build-
ings.' 0 ' The Ministry of the Interior is charged with implement-
ing this act by setting up district and county level committees to
review each land parcel transfer. With ownership rights comes
the clear legal authority to sell the property. Such authority is
critical to the development of the real estate market because it
identifies competent sellers to potential buyers, and provides for
enforceable contracts of sale, thereby reducing the longstanding
dilemma of unclear or clouded title.
2. Claims of Former Owners
Title to both publicly and privately held real estate is not likely
to be complicated by restitution, or "reprivatization" in Hungary
as it was in Poland, Romania, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and
Slovenia. 0 2 Hungary's solution to the perceived injustices
caused by socialist expropriations is Law XXV, the Compensa-
tion Act of 1991.103 This law partially compensates both Hun-
garians and foreigners whose property was expropriated through
regulations enacted after 1939.104 Compensation consists of
100. See 1991. 6vi XXXIII. t6rv4ny egyes Ilami tulajdonban 16v6 vagyontrgyak
6nkormnyzatok tulajdonba adsr6l [Act XXXIII of 1991 on Transferring Some State
Owned Assets into the Ownership of Local Governments], Hatlyos magyarjogszablyok,
July 12, 1991, translated in HUNGARIAN RULES OF LAW IN FORCE SPECIAL EDrrION 54
(1991). In addition, the Act transfers to local governments, among other things: histori-
cal architecture; certain undeveloped land; public utilities exclusively serving that com-
munity; public transportation; and certain parks. Id. § 1, 1-25.
101. Conflicting claims now exist between the two levels of local government, the
municipalities, and the districts, although it is generally anticipated that the districts will
assume ownership rights. Buildings on plots of land larger than 1000 square meters are
transferred to the State Property Agency, and former Party property is transferred to the
Hungarian Treasury Trust under the Ministry of Finance.
102. For a discussion of the problems in these countries see Gray et al., Poland, supra
note 2; Gray et al., Romania, supra note 2. See also Gray, Czech Republic, supra note 2; Gray
& Stiblar, supra note 2 (discussing Slovenia).
103. See 1991. 6vi XXV. t6rv~ny a tulajdonviszonyok rendez~se &rdek~ben, az lam
Ital az llampolgrok tulajdonban igazsgtalanul okozott krok r6szleges krp6tlsr6l [Law
XXV of 1991 on partial compensation for damages unlawfully caused by the state to
properties owned by citizens in the interest of settling ownership relations], Hatlyos
magyar jogszablyok, Aug. 15, 1991, translated in Nr. II./16. HUNGARIAN RULES OF LAW IN
FORCE 1127 (1991) [hereinafter Compensation Act of 1991].
104. Id. 1(1) (defining those who are eligible to receive compensation).
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lump-sum payments in the form of coupons, the amount of which
is determined by the value of the nationalized property. 0 5 The
first HUF 200,000 ($2300) of damages is to be compensated at
100%. The next HUF 100,000 ($1150) is to be compensated at
50%. The next HUF 200,000 ($2300) is to be compensated at
30%. Any remaining damages (those exceeding HUF 500,001
($5760)) are to be compensated at 10%.106 By law, the maximum
payment for a piece of property cannot exceed HUF 5 million
($57,600).107
The coupons function as transferable bearer securities and pay
interest at seventy-five percent of the basic interest rate of the
central bank until the summer of 1994.108 Compensation cou-
pons may be used as full or partial payment for propertysold by
the state, including apartments, shares-in privatized state-owned
industries, and farmland.' 09 A separate law is planned to enable
the coupons to be transformed into life annuities to provide
social insurance for their holders. It also seems possible to
pledge the coupons as collateral for loans.1t
Only former land owners may use their coupons to purchase
farmland. Such land will be sold to the highest bidder at an auc-
tion." In theory, former land owners may repurchase their
original land-if they prove to be the highest bidder and if their
particular parcel is to be auctioned. However, the land that will
be auctioned is not likely to be the most fertile; the best land is
currently held by cooperatives, which are expected to retain pos-
session of their land under the new laws. Cooperatives are set-
ting aside approximately 2.4 million hectares, and state farms
about 0.4 million hectares, for compensation auctions.
During the August through October 1991 time period for sub-
mitting claims, 805,000 individuals submitted 3.3 million claims
worth about HUF 60 billion ($692 million). About 3 million
claims refer to confiscated land. Another HUF 20-30 billion
105. Id. 3, 5.
106. Id. $ 4. On April 1, 1993 one U.S. dollar was equal to 86.79 forints or "HUF"
(the Hungarian unit of currency). Exchange Rates, WALL ST. J., Apr. 2, 1993, at C13.




111. The original draft Compensation Act of April 1990 allowed former farmland
owners to exchange their compensation coupons for their original land. The Constitu-
tional Court declared this law unconstitutional, as it discriminated against former own-
ers of urban and industrial property, who were given coupons but not the possibility of
in-kind restitution. See Hungarian Confiscation Law, WASH. POsT, May 31, 1991, at A24.
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($230 to $346 million) in claims is expected from the extension
of the act to include claims covering 1939-1949 by Jews and
Germans; and a final HUF 20 billion ($230 million) from a pro-
posed extension to cover individuals who have been politically
persecuted. It is estimated that the government will pay out a
total of about HUF 100 billion ($1.15 billion) pursuant to these
claims. It is expected that about one-half of the distributed
vouchers will be used to purchase land and the other half split
between purchases of apartments, shares in privatized enter-
prises, rental rights to small shops, and annuities. The distribu-
tion of vouchers began March 31, 1992, and is expected to take
up to two years.
There is some doubt whether Hungary's solution to the resti-
tution problem will achieve its stated restitutionary goals. For
example, in light of the shortage of attractive privatized assets,
vouchers and the shares bought with them may well be traded at
a substantial discount from their face value. Nevertheless, Hun-
gary's compensation law is a significant achievement in the area
of private sector development because it avoids the problem of
clouded title to real property.
3. Land Registration
Developing an adequate registry to determine legitimate title
for privately-owned property is less controversial than allocating
property, but it is no less fundamental."l 2 As noted earlier, most
housing remained in private hands throughout the socialist
period. Buyers have always had an incentive to register their
purchases in the property registry because under the Civil Code,
title passes only upon such recordation.' 1 3 Moreover, registered
owners have priority over other claimants because unrecorded
transactions are not enforceable against third parties. Thus, the
existing property registry provides adequate proof of private title
in many cases, including private houses and apartments.
This is not to say, however, that the land registry is an accurate
portrayal of current property ownership. Some private buyers,
112. See generally A Report on the Technical and Legal Aspects of the Creation of a Computerized
Land Title Registration System in Hungary (Hungarian-American Enterprise Fund, Buda-
pest), Nov. 12, 1991 [hereinafter Land Title Report] (on file with The George Washington
Journal of International Law and Economics). This report, prepared by the Stewart Informa-
tion Services Group and Weil, Gotshal & Manges under the sponsorship of the Hun-
garian-American Enterprise Fund, was presented to officials of the Ministry of
Agriculture in Budapest on November 13, 1991.
113. Civil Code, supra note 66, T 117.
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whose individual holdings exceeded permissible levels, avoided
registration during the socialist period. Furthermore, national-
izations by the state and transfers among public owners-particu-
larly of trustee rights sold by state enterprises since the late
1970s-were not typically recorded in the land registry; nor were
individual flats registered in many large state housing develop-
ments. Agricultural land records are in the poorest condition
because of extensive nationalizations and cooperative regroup-
ings." 4 Finally, missing records, inadequate staff, and lengthy
delays in the land registration process-six months being the
current norm-add to the uncertainty in real estate transactions.
C. Financing the Acquisition of Property
1. Commercial Property
Mortgages of real property have long been permissible under
Hungarian law. The Civil Code provides for the use of real
estate-usually the very piece of property being financed-as col-
lateral."l 5 However, such mortgages have been rare, primarily
because commercial ventures have been rare. Local financing of
commercial property has recently become more readily available,
at least for property being privatized by the government. The
National Bank of Hungary refinances credit extended by com-
mercial banks to private Hungarian citizens for purchasing state
assets, including real estate, sold by the State Property
Agency." 6 Despite this availability of financing, as well as the
growing need for commercial mortgages, real estate lenders may
be discouraged by the new Bankruptcy Law, which grants priority
over registered mortgage liens to tax claims and wages, including
severance payments. Direct foreign financing of commercial
property development is not possible in practice, as foreign
banks are prohibited from registering mortgage liens on Hun-
garian real estate.
Private real estate developers argue that the main constraints
are not the regulatory hurdles-compared with Western regula-
tory hurdles-but rather are the unrealistically high prices asked
114. Pursuant to Law Decree 31 of 1972, the entire land registry, including urban
land, was placed under the direction of the Ministry of Agriculture.
115. Civil Code, supra note 66, 265-269.
116. This credit may also be used for purchasing shares in companies being priva-
tized at a preferential rate of 75% of the National Bank of Hungary refinancing rate.
This scheme is limited to support of the privatization process and is not available to
individuals purchasing previously privatized or privately-owned property.
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by local governments. Moreover, local government and State
Property Agency requirements for public tenders have also
tended to stifle deals.
2. Residential Property
As with commercial property, mortgages on residential real
estate have long been legally permissible, yet seldom used in
practice. Lenders have been discouraged from making substan-
tial mortgages because of the lack of any effective legal mecha-
nisms to repossess the collateral in cases of default. Tenant
protection laws, grounded in the still-applicable 1971 Housing
Act, make foreclosure and eviction a cumbersome and futile
endeavor. Under these laws, lenders seeking to carry out evic-
tions must provide altelnfiative living quarters, which is often a
difficult process given the shortage of available housing. More-
over, since clearing all of the procedural hurdles to evictions can
take up to five years, few, if any, cases of foreclosure result in
eviction. Wage garnishment and third-party wage guarantees
have typically been used as alternatives to secure mortgages, but
these options are limited by the priorities given to tax, alimony,
and other possible claims.
Housing reforms in 1983 allowed household savings account
deposits to be used as mortgage collateral in lieu of the actual
property and established a housing finance system of subsidized
interest rates. 1 7 This scheme resulted in a stock of housing
loans with a market value significantly below book value-a stock
later noted as the single most important factor leading to the
technical insolvency of Hungary's portfolio-holding institu-
tions.""i In mid-1991, this portfolio was cleaned up: the loans
were taken away from the banks, borrowers were offered substan-
tial loan forgiveness in exchange for accepting new terms, and
the remaining portfolio was returned to the banks containing
market rate loans with an explicit budget allocation to cover the
loan forgiveness.' 19
117. See SILVIA B. SAGARI & Loic CHIQUIER, COPING WITH THE LEGACIES OF SUBSI-
DIZED MORTGAGE CREDIT IN HUNGARY 2-3 (World Bank Policy Research Working Paper
Series No. WPS847, Jan. 1992).
118. Id.
119. After the law was rejected on procedural grounds by the Constitutional Court
in 1990, it was correctly passed in mid-1991. The law gives borrowers the following
options: (1) have the loan converted to a 15% fixed rate loan with the possibility of
having the rate adjusted from year to year; or (2) have half the loan forgiven-that is,
bought out by the government-and the other half either (a) repaid in full by the bor-
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By 1989, interest rate subsidies were eliminated so that when
current loans were issued, they carried market interest rates,
which are currently about forty-five percent for fifteen-year, fixed
rate loans. 120 While interest rate subsidies were eliminated,
numerous other up-front subsidies remain, such as subsidies
based on the number of children or the purpose of the loan.' 2 1
Compounding the problem is the fact that Hungarian banks are
inexperienced in underwriting techniques; since fixed-rate mort-
gages are risky in the presence of significant inflation, few mort-
gages are actually being written. In practice, banks will make
small loans only up to the amount of subsidies covered by the
government. Most real estate transactions are conducted in cash.
A final area of concern in financing real property is the legal
status of multi-family dwellings; the availability of clear title to
individual units is important if such units are to serve as mort-
gage collateral. Law Decree 11 of 1977 on Condominiums
updates the 1920s condominium law and places Hungary well
ahead of other CEE countries such as Czechoslovakia and Alba-
nia, which still do not have condominium laws. However, inade-
quacies in enforcing the law threaten to paralyze the process of
renovation and rehabilitation of the Hungarian housing stock.'2 2
D. Regulatory Issues
1. The Rental Sector
A large and healthy rental sector is one of the best indicators of
a well-functioning real estate market, allowing wide household
choice and facilitating labor mobility. 23 Hungary's restrictive
rower or (b) converted to a market rate loan. To the government's surprise, over 40%
paid back the loans, an indication of the monetary overhang in the economy; about 40%
converted to market rate loans, and the balance took the 15% loan. The Polish Parlia-
ment similarly responded to their credit crisis by rewriting existing housing loans to
eliminate unsustainable subsidies.
120. See Land Title Report, supra note 112, at 21 (quoting rates of 40-50% for terms
between 2 and 15 years). The primary mortgage lenders are the National Savings Bank
and the Cooperative Savings Bank. Id. Under their policies, loan maximums are set such
that households pay no more than 33% of verified household net income. Id.
121. See FERENC R~vksz, How TO DO BUSINESS IN HUNGARY: MANAGEMENT OF Hous-
ING FINANCES 5-6 (PERFEKT Fin. Postgraduate Training Series No. 21, 1991) (on file
with The .George Washington Journal of International Law and Economics).
122. See generally CAROL S. RABENHORST, CONDOMINIUM OPERATIONS AND MANAGE-
MENT IN BUDAPEST: STATUS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE OF THE PRIVATIZED HOUS-
ING MARKET (The Urban Inst., Wash. D.C., Project No. 6251-03, Oct., 1992).
123. Labor mobility is particularly critical during the transition from a planned to
market economy, as many old enterprises are forced into major restructuring or liquida-
tion and newly emerging private firms expand employment opportunities.
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eviction procedures are the key bottleneck to a fluid rental mar-
ket. As in the case of mortgage foreclosure, landlords seeking to
evict tenants who have defaulted on their rent are obliged to find
an alternative housing unit for such tenants. 124 Unlike the case of
mortgage default, renters who default on their rent payments are
not subject to garnishment of wages. An expedited lease termi-
nation procedure is, however, available for certain types of public
landlords. 125
Rent control for publicly-owned residential property is one of
the most politically difficult issues on the current Hungarian pol-
icy agenda. Current rent levels do not allow local governments
to recover even operating costs for housing stock, much less cap-
ital costs, a condition which has contributed to the chronic
under-maintenance and the increasingly dilapidated condition of
much of the housing stock. According to most observers, central
government regulations still determine rent levels for the public
housing stock, although some argue that this power has been
devolved to local governments. Rents in these units probably
will not be raised without clear action by the central government.
In a second group of quasi-public units, the central govern-
ment eliminated rent control on "forced tenancies" in January
1992. These 100,000-odd private units were forcibly created
during the 1940s and 1950s and allocated according to state
rules. Tenants generally now view these units as public housing
and have resisted owners' attempts to raise rents since January
1992, usually by successfully appealing to local district councils.
In the slowly emerging purely private stock, there are no rent
controls. Rental agreements are set by lease and are usually for a
fixed term. Disputes between landlords and tenants in private
housing are typically handled directly through self-help meas-
ures; cumbersome enforcement procedures and the
overburdened judicial system are generally avoided.
124. The draft Rental Housing Bill currently being discussed in Hungary would
begin the process of removing some of the worst constraints on eviction, particularly by
eliminating the requirement that an alternative unit be provided.
125. The Court Enforcement Office polices the debt collection and eviction process
in Hungary. In 1991, the Budapest office received between 3000-4000 new claims each
month for debt collection, but had only 16 enforcement officers for the whole city. The
Office has not been active in mortgage foreclosures and has rarely pursued evictions in
cases where renters of privately-owned apartments have failed to pay their rent.
Although courts have rendered thousands of verdicts for eviction, the Office carries out
at most only 30 evictions per year from private rental units, after an average eviction
process of four to five years.
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2. Zoning and Construction Standards
Zoning is another area in need of clarification. Hungary has
emerged from socialism with a diffuse and inefficient pattern of
land use. Currently, the zoning system is in limbo. Old regula-
tions are not necessarily being followed, no general land-use
framework has been established, and the authority to regulate
has not been vested fully in local governments. Although ques-
tions of title are being addressed, authority over zoning and
building regulations has yet to be distributed among local actors.
Currently, this authority may be exercised by district or county
governments, city planning departments, public utility authori-
ties, county commissioners, or a number of central ministries.
Because owners are unsure from whom to seek necessary per-
mits, they often attempt to secure permission" from everyone-
those who currently appear to exercise authority as well as those
who formerly did. This is clearly an inefficient and time consum-
ing process.
Furthermore, not only is there a surfeit of potential regulatory
authority in some areas, but there is a problematic lack of it in
others. For example, some regulations needed by private real
estate developers, such as regulations governing commercial
scale residential, commercial, and industrial subdivisions of
undeveloped land, still do not exist. Nor is there an appropriate
regulatory framework governing infrastructure needs and financ-
ing for private land development-for example, a framework that
would permit exactions, special assessments, or land readjust-
ment. A 1991 modification of the Building Law permits conver-
sion to industrial uses of agricultural land at the urban fringe,
usually the most dynamic area for commercial land development,
upon payment of a transfer fine to a land protection fund, but the
actual impact of such regulation needs to be tested. Finally,
building standards are governed by the 1990 National Building
Code and the old 1986 Budapest city planning rules. A new con-
struction law has yet to be written with affordable building stan-
dards for the types of buildings that market systems are likely to
demand.
In summary, a modern land use planning system with clearly
defined procedures is required-a planning system that offers
wide discretion to the market, forces developers to internalize
their environmental costs, and provides a dispute resolution
mechanism that fairly balances the interests of neighbors, devel-
opers, and city government.
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IV. RIGHTS TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
The legal framework for intellectual property protection in
Hungary has been considered better than those available in other
CEE countries. However, investigation and enforcement remain
a problem, resulting in widespread piracy of software, music, and
pharmaceuticals, among other things. As Hungary begins to rec-
ognize and protect private property rights in general, intellectual
property may also begin to receive better protection. This will
require, however, stronger investigative and enforcement poli-
cies, without which infringements will be difficult to curb.
A. Patents
As in other CEE countries, Hungarian patent law had little
meaning within the domestic economy during the socialist
period. The state owned not only most of the physical means of
production, but also the rights to most inventions used in pro-
duction. Almost all workers were employees of the state, and
there was little competition or reward for entrepreneurship in
ideas. The main demand for intellectual property protection
arose from foreign firms doing business in Hungary.
Hungary's current domestic legislation on patents stems from
the socialist period and includes primarily Patent Act No. II of
1969.126 As with many Western laws,' 27 these laws give an inven-
tor exclusive rights over an invention 12 for twenty years from the
date of application. 29 Like other socialist patent legislation and
unlike most Western law, however, Hungarian patent law prohib-
126. See 1969. 6vi II. T6rv~ny a talmnyok szabadalmi oltalmr6l, a v6grehajtsr6l sz616
4/1969. (XII. 28.) OMFB-IM egyiittes rendelet, valamint a 9/1969. (XII. 28.) IM
rendelet a bir6sgi eljrsr6l szabadalmi iugyekben egys~ges szerkezetbe foglalt sz6vege
[Act II of 1969 on the Patent Protection of Inventions; Joint Decree 4/1969 (Dec. 28.)
Issued by the National Committee of Technical Development and the Minister ofJustice
on Its Implementetion [sic]; and Decree No. 9/1969 (Dec. 28.) by the Minister ofJustice
on Court Proceedings in Patent Cases], Hatlyos magyar jogszablyok, Apr. 26, 1969,
translated in Nr. II./l 1. HUNGARIAN RULES OF LAW IN FORCE 778 (1991) [hereinafter Pat-
ent Law]. Two other laws, Decree-Law No. 5 of 1983 on Patents, and Decree No. 28 of
1978 on the Protection of Industrial Designs, are also part of Hungary's domestic patent
legislation.
127. For a comprehensive discussion of intellectual property laws on a global scale,
see generally James P. Chandler, Protection of U.S. Competitiveness in the International
Software Markets: Reexamining the Question of Copyrighting Government-Created Software, 25
GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 387 (1991).
128. Patentable inventions must be novel, meaning that the public must not have
access to the design through the print media or common knowledge or practice. See
Patent Law, supra note 126, ch. I, §§ 1-2.
129. Patent Law, supra note 126, ch. II, § 12(1).
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its certain inventions from being patented, including
pharmaceuticals, chemically fabricated products, food products,
and immoral items.130 The Hungarian Patent Office is planning
to remove these prohibitions to harmonize the act with the Euro-
pean "norm" and allow Hungary to apply for associate member-
ship in the European Patent System. This amendment is close to
being finalized, and a complete revision of the Patent Act is
expected to be presented by 1994.
Hungary's patent law also provides for "compulsory licenses,"
by which the state can grant use rights to third parties if an inven-
tion has not been sufficiently utilized within three years of being
patented.' 3' In this situation, parties may negotiate the proper
licensing fee, but if a fee cannot be agreed upon by the patentee
and the licensee, it will be fixed by a court. 32 It remains to be
seen whether this provision will be removed when the Patent Act
is revised; it is interesting to note that a similar provision
remained in Romania's new patent law of 1991.133 Practically
speaking, however, the compulsory licensing power is unlikely to
be used often, as such licenses are usually ineffective due to the
user's likely need for the patent holder's technological expertise
and cooperation.
A related provision allows the government to license any pat-
ent at will for purposes of the national defense. 34 It is unclear
what type of compensation is available in such circumstances,
although the Constitution provides a general guarantee of com-
pensation in cases of expropriation. As with the compulsory
license provision, it remains to be seen whether this state power
will remain in Hungary's patent law.
Hungary has been a signatory to the 1883 Paris Convention for
the Protection of Industrial Property since 1967.' 3 5 The two
130. Id. ch. I, § 6(3)(a)-(b).
131. Id. ch. II, § 11(3). Chapter IV, section 21 discusses and defines compulsory
licensing. These provisions are known throughout the world and are permitted under
the Paris Convention, discussed below.
132. Id. ch. IV, § 23(3).
133. See Gray et al., Romania, supra note 2, at 627-28.
134. Patent Law, supra note 126, ch. IV, § 24(1).
135. See Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883,
25 Stat. 1372, 161 Consol. T.S. 409 [hereinafter Paris Convention], amended Dec. 14,
1900, 32 Stat. 1936, 189 Consol. T.S. 134, amended June 2, 1911, 38 Stat. 1645, 213
Consol. T.S. 405, amended Nov. 6, 1925, 47 Stat. 1789, 74 L.N.T.S. 289, amendedJune 2,
1934, 53 Stat. 1748, 192 L.N.T.S. 17, amended Oct. 31, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 1, 828 U.N.T.S.
108, amendedJuly 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 306; UNITED STATES DEPART-
MENT OF STATE, TREATIES IN FORCE: 1991 at 327-28 (1992) [hereinafter TREATIES IN
FORCE].
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most important rights granted by the treaty concern national
treatment of foreignersl.36 and the right of priority in registra-
tion. 3 7 The right to national treatment obligates countries to
treat foreigners as they would treat their own nationals under
their own laws.'13 The right of priority gives the holder of a pat-
ent one year to file in other member countries without losing pri-
ority rights over other potential claimants to the invention. 139
The criteria for patentability are, however, still questions of
domestic law. Thus, without a Hungarian law that provides relia-
ble substantive patent rights, the Paris Convention can do little
to protect patents.
All patent applications in Hungary are submitted to the
National Patent Office, which conducts a formal examination of
the application. 40 The process takes approximately eighteen
months, which is normal by Western standards. The application
fee itself is nominal, HUF 1000-2000 ($12-$23), as is the annual
fee of HUF 6000 ($69) for the first five years. 14 1 Thereafter, the
fee grows incrementally, reaching HUF 24,000 ($277) in the
twentieth year.' 42 Finally, decisions of the Patent Office may be
appealed to the Metropolitan Court, and from there to the
Supreme Court. 143
B. Trademarks
Trademarks in Hungary are protected by Act No. IX of
1969.144 This law grants exclusive rights of use and transfer of
registered trademarks for an initial period of ten years, renewa-
ble for ten year periods thereafter.14 5 Like patents, trademarks
are to be registered at the Patent Office. 146 Fees are HUF 3000
($35) for the first ten years, and an additional HUF 1000 ($12)
136. Paris Convention, supra note 135, art. 2(1).
137. Id. art. 4C(1).
138. Id. art. 2.
139. Id. art. 4C(1).
140. See Patent Law, supra note 126, ch. VIII, § 44(1).
141. See Hungary, in INVESTING, LICENSING & TRADING CONDITIONS ABROAD, July
1992, at 9 [hereinafter ILT CONDITIONS ABROAD].
142. Id.
143. See Patent Law, supra note 126, ch. X, § 58(1)-(2).
144. Law No. IX of 1969 on Trademarks completed with the rules according to Joint
Decree No. 2/1970 (July 1) OMFB-IM of the President of the National Committee for
Technical Development and of the Minister of Justice on the Execution of the Law.
145. Id. ch. II, art. 6(1)-(2).
146. Id. ch. VII, art. 20(a).
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for international registration.14 7
As a signatory to the Paris Convention, Hungary grants
national treatment, as well as the right of priority, to foreign
trademark owners. 48 The right of priority lasts six months for
trademarks, as opposed to one year for patents. 49 The Paris
Convention does, however, provide a bit more substantive pro-
tection for trademarks than for patents by automatically protect-
ing well-known marks, apparently without requiring that the
mark be registered in other member countries. 50
Hungary is also a signatory to the most current text of the
Madrid Agreement Concerning the International Registration of
Marks.15 1 The Madrid Agreement protects both trademarks and
service marks by allowing members of signatory countries to reg-
ister their trademarks with the International Bureau of the World
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) in Geneva. 52 The
mark must first be registered in the country of origin, whose
administration applies for registration with WIPO. Registration
with WIPO protects a mark in all signatory countries. Upon noti-
fication of WIPO registration, however, national administrations
still may be authorized by national law to declare that certain
trademark protection cannot be granted in that territory. Thus,
like the Paris Convention, the Madrid Agreement ultimately
depends upon domestic law to protect substantive rights.
C. Copyright
The current Hungarian law providing copyright protection is
the Hungarian Copyright Act No. III of 1969.' 5 3 This law is con-
sidered the most advanced of all CEE copyright laws because it
has contained some protection for computer programs since
1983, and it is generally consistent with European norms. 154 In
147. See ILT CONDITIONS ABROAD, supra note 141, at 9.
148. See supra notes 135-139 and accompanying text.
149. See Paris Convention, supra note 135, art. 4C(1).
150. Id. art. 6bis.
151. See Madrid Arrangement Concerning the International Registration of Marks,
Apr. 14, 1891, 828 U.N.T.S. 389. The Madrid Agreement has been revised a number of
times, most recently in 1967.
152. See Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization, July
14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1749, 828 U.N.T.S. 3 (hereinafter WIPO Convention].
153. Hungarian Copyright Act No. III of 1969, as amended in 1978, implemented by
Decree No. 9 of July 12, 1983. For a thorough discussion of this law, see Eric J.
Schwartz, Recent Developments in the Copyright Regimes of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe,
38J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y U.S.A. 123, 140-42 (1991).
154. Schwartz, supra note 153, at 140.
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keeping with the commonly accepted language of copyright pro-
tection, this law protects "literary, scientific and artistic cre-
ations."' 55 While such language in other countries is often
interpreted not to include computer software, the decree imple-
menting the Hungarian law expressly includes "computer pro-
grams and the related documentation."' 5
6
Sound recordings are protected under Decree-Law No. 19 of
1975 on the Protection of Producers of Phonograms. 57 This
protection grants producers the exclusive right to reproduce, dis-
tribute, or publicly perform the work in question, but it neglects
to protect the more important economic rights to commercial
renting and lending. 58 Furthermore, criminal sanctions are not
available to protect the rights granted in the decree. 59
Registration of copyrighted work is not required under Hun-
garian law; works are protected upon creation. In general, works
are protected for fifty years after the death of the author. 60
Sound recordings, however, are protected for only twenty
years. 16'
Chapter V of the Copyright Act lays out certain restrictions on
contracting with Hungarian authors or users. 162 Such contracts
must be made through the intermediary agencies listed in article
20 of the Implementation Decree. 63 One such agency is ARTIS-
JUS, a governmental agency functioning as a performing rights
society, a copyright licensing agency, and a copyright spokesman
for the government. In addition, most copyright disputes are
mediated by ARTISJUS, although they may be brought before
the Metropolitan Court.
In cases of copyright infringement, civil remedies include
injunctions, damages, fines, and possibly destruction of the
155. Id. at 141 (quoting Hungarian Copyright Statute of 1979, as amended up to
1978, ch. I, art. 1).
156. Id. (quoting Decree Concerning the Implementation of the Copyright Act No.
III of 1969, Decree No. 9 of Dec. 29, 1969, as amended up to July 12, 1983, art. 1). A
related advance in this field is the recent Act on the Protection of the Topography of the
Microelectronic Semiconductor Products. See Memorandum prepared by Dr. Andrs
Szecskay, Attorney at Law, S.B.G. & K. Patent and Law Office, Budapest (on file with The
George Washington Journal of International Law and Economics).
157. Schwartz, supra note 153, at 141-42.
158. Id. at 142.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 141.
161. Although the international norm is 50 years, Hungarian law only protects
sound recordings for 20 years. Id. at 142.




offending material.'6 Under government decree, infringements
of Hungarian copyright law qualify as misdemeanor offenses.'
65
Some observers advocate additional criminal sanctions in cases
of willful infringement, sanctions that exist in most European
countries. 16 6 Such sanctions are expected to be included in an
upcoming amendment to the Penal Code.
67
Since 1922, Hungary has been a signatory to the Berne Con-
vention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works,
168
which protects literary, scientific, and artistic works. It adheres to
the most recent revision of the Berne Convention: the Paris text
of 1971, which extends the period of protection from twenty-five
to fifty years. 169 Under the Berne Convention, no formalities are
required to protect a work in other member countries. 170 While
protection may depend upon registration in the country of ori-
gin, no central registration exists for international protection;
works are protected upon creation.' 7' Also, Hungary has been a
signatory to both the Universal Copyright Convention since Jan-
uary 1971 (including the Paris Act, July 1974)172 and the Geneva
Phonograms Convention since 1975.173
164. Id. at 142 (citing Copyright Statute of 1979, as amended up to 1978, ch. XIII,
arts. 52-53).
165. See Rules and Problems in Copyright Law, HUNG. ECON. REV., Oct. 1991, at 24 (not-
ing that government decree declares the unlawful use of an author's work to be a
misdemeanor).
166. See id.; see also INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ALLIANCE, COPYRIGHT
LAWS OF EASTERN EUROPE AND THE U.S.S.R. 28 (Nov.- 1990) [hereinafter IIPA REPORT].
167. Rules and Problems in Copyright Law, supra note 165, at 24. The International
Intellectual Property Association reports that as of November 1990, criminal incarcera-
tion of up to three years is available for plagiarism causing material loss to the author.
See IIPA REPORT, supra note 166, at 28.
168. See Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9,
1886, completed May 4, 1896, revised Berlin, Nov. 13, 1908, 1 L.N.T.S. 217, completed
Berne, Mar. 20, 1914, revised Rome, June 2, i928, 123 L.N.T.S. 234, revised Brussels,
June 26, 1948, 31 U.N.T.S. 217, revised Stockholm, July 14, 1967, 828 U.N.T.S. 221,
revised July 24, 1971, S. TREAT Doc. No. 27, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986); TREATIES IN
FORCE, supra note 135, at 295.
169. Id. art. 7(1).
170. Id. art. 5.
171. Id.
172. See Universal Copyright Convention, Sept. 6, 1952, 6 U.S.T. 2731, 216 U.N.T.S.
132, revised July 24, 1967, 25 U.S.T 1341, 943 U.N.T.S. 178; TREATIES IN FORCE, supra
note 135, at 403-16.
173. See Convention for the Protection of Producers of Phonograms Against Unau-
thorized Duplication of Their Phonograms, Oct. 29, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 309, 866 U.N.T.S.
67; TREATIES IN FORCE, supra note 135, at 362.
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V. COMPANY LAW
Company law plays a central role in market economies. It sets
guidelines for the internal organization of private companies and
for systems of corporate governance. Together with securities
legislation, company law protects outside investors and the pub-
lic by specifying minimum requirements for capital and the dis-
semination of information about the company. It also
encourages entrepreneurship by setting limits on the liability of
investors. Because the notions of private capital, private invest-
ment, and private commercial liability are relatively new in Hun-
gary and other reforming socialist economies, all of these
functions of company law are also relatively new in the CEE
context.
The idea of firm-level independence and autonomy is not an
entirely new concept in Hungary. From 1875 to 1948, Hungary's
company law had been developing in tandem with those of its
Western neighbors. That line of company law was abandoned
after the introduction of socialism, although it was never formally
abrogated. For two decades after 1948, Hungary followed the
classical model of centrally planned socialism.
Then, in an attempt to move away from strict socialism toward
a socialist market economy, Hungary adopted the New Economic
Mechanism (NEM) in 1968.174 As discussed earlier, the NEM
delegated more decision making to the enterprise level. Enter-
prises were still expected to meet their production targets under
the state economic plan, but they retained freedom to make their
own decisions regarding the means-including labor and invest-
ment needs-to meet those ends.' 7 5
Enterprise autonomy was first legally recognized in Act No. VI
of 1977 on State-Owned Enterprises. 76 The true landmark of
enterprise management reform, however, appeared with the
1984 amendment to this act, Decree No. 33.177 This amendment
introduced the concept of the self-managed enterprise, whose
174. See, e.g., BELA BALASSA, THE HUNGARIAN ECONOMIC REFORM, 1968-198 1, at 4-10
(World Bank Staff Working Paper No. 506, 1982).
175. See, e.g., Steven W. Popper, Hungarian Management in Transition: Enterprise
Guidance in an Era of Economic Reform (1986) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
The George Washington Journal of International Law and Economics) (describing the economic
environment after the introduction of the New Economic Mechanism).
176. 1977. vi VI. torvhny az Ilami vllalatokr6l [Act No. VI of 1977 on state-owned
enterprises], Hatlyos magyar jogszablyok, Dec. 15, 1990, translated in I./Nr. 25. HUN-
GARIAN RULES OF LAW IN FORCE 1523 (1990).
177. Id.
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management could take one of two forms: (1) the enterprise
council, which is a representative body of employees; or (2) the
general assembly of employees. 178 As a result of this law,
approximately eighty percent of Hungary's enterprises became
self-managed, 79 while the remainder stayed under central state
administrative control.
In the late 1980s, Hungary made a series of reforms designed
to further its transformation toward a market economy. Unlike
Poland, which revived its pre-war company law,'8 0 Hungary used
this opportunity to draft Act VI of 1988 on Business Organiza-
tions (Companies Act), an entirely new code based upon the Ger-
man and Austrian codes.' 8 ' As in other CEE countries,
Hungarian company law governs the establishment of new com-
panies, as well as the "corporatization" of what were formerly
state-owned enterprises. 8 2 The law recognizes a number of dif-
ferent forms of business organization, including' the joint stock
company, 8 3 the limited liability company, 8 4 and both general
and limited partnerships. 85
A. The Joint Stock Company
In Hungary, the joint stock company is often referred to as the
178. Id. at 1532, 1537.
179. Self-management was-a concept that had been followed in neighboring Yugo-
slavia since the early 1950s. This concept is designed to give employees specific powers
over management even though they may not have an ownership interest. For an incisive
analysis of its economic impact, see MANUEL HINDS, ISSUES IN THE INTRODUCTION OF
MARKET FORCES IN EASTERN EUROPEAN SOCIALIST ECONOMIES 20-54 (The World Bank
Europe, Middle East and North Africa Region Internal Discussion Paper No. IDP-0057,
Apr. 1990).
180. See Gray et. al., Poland, supra note 2, at 295-96.
181. See 1988. 6vi VI. t6rv~ny a gazdasgi trsasgokr6l [Act VI of 1988 on Business
Organizations (Companies Act)], Hatlyos magyarjogszablyok, Feb. 1, 1992, translated in
Nr. 111./3-4. HUNGARIAN RULES OF LAw IN FORCE 167 (1992) [hereinafter Company
Law].
182. See 1989. 6vi XIII. t6rv~ny a gazdlkod6 szervezetek s a gazdasgi trsasgok
talakulsr6l [Act No. XIII of 1989 on the conversion of economic organizations and busi-
ness associations], Hatlyos magyar jogszablyok, Dec. 15, 1990, translated in I./Nr. 25.
HUNGARIAN RULES OF LAW IN FORCE 1573 (1990) [hereinafter Conversion Law]. The
term "corporatization" is used to refer to the legal transformation of state-owned enter-
prises into corporate forms set out in the Act on Economic Associations.
183. The joint stock company is discussed infra notes 186-227 and accompanying
text.
184. The limited liability form had been available for use since 1972, but it was
restricted to joint ventures with foreign participation. See infra notes 228-253 and accom-
panying text.
185. See infra notes 254-257 and accompanying text.
Geo. Wash. J. Int'l L. & Econ.
"company limited by shares"18 6 or the share company. It resem-
bles the French societe anonyme (S.A.), the German Aktien-
gesellschaft (A.G.), and the American publicly held corporation.
The Hungarian joint stock company is designated by the letters
"Rt" in its name. 8 7 This form, most appropriate for companies
seeking a large number of shareholders, is the most conducive to
public offerings.
1. Capitalization and Disclosure Requirements
Ajoint stock company may be founded by one or more individ-
uals. 18 8 Minimum capital requirements are high: HUF 10 million
($115,000), of which at least thirty percent must be paid in upon
registration.189 The value of non-cash contributions also may be
included in capital, if checked by an auditor and disclosed by the
founders in a written declaration.190  .
A joint stock company provides the most freely transferable
vehicle for investment. Both bearer shares and registered shares
are freely transferable. 19' Joint stock companies also offer the
greatest flexibility in obtaining capital, although many of the
financial instruments envisioned in the Company Act are not yet
used in practice. As discussed below, the practical problems are
due in large part to a lack of familiarity on the part of Hungarian
investors.
A wide variety of stock classes are authorized by the Company
Act; however, shares within the same class must have identical
face value. 192 Voting rights of different shares may differ without
limit, as long as this is specified in the company's charter. 93
While voting rights are generally proportional to share value, the
articles may limit those rights. 194
186. See Conversion Law, supra note 182, ch. VII.
187. See Company Law, supra note 181, art. 232(2).
188. Id. art. 250.
189. Id. art. 251. Such a high minimum capital requirement discourages the forma-
tion of companies and would seem inadvisable for Hungary at this time.
190. Id. art. 253(l)-(3). While not explicitly stated in the law, it is presumed that the
Court of Registration, in reviewing the articles of association, may challenge this
valuation.
191. Id. art. 240. Transfers of registered shares are governed by the rules regulating
bills of exchange. See 1/1965. (1.24.) IM rendelet a vlt6jogi szablyok sz6veg~nek k6z-
zt~telt6l [Decree of the Minister ofJustice No. 1/1965 (1.24.) on the Publication of the
Regulations Concerning Bills of Exchange Law], Hatlyos magyar jogszablyok, Feb. 1,
1992, translated in Nr. 19-20. HUNGARIAN RULES OF LAw IN FORCE 1142 (1992).
192. Company Law, supra note 181, art. 234(3).
193. Id.
194. Compare id. art. 242(1) ("The voting rights attached ... may be restricted or
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Companies may issue preferred shares, which entitle the owner
to priority in the distribution of dividends. The total value of all
preferred shares, however, may not exceed fifty percent of the
company's registered capital. 195 Such preferred shares may carry
limited or zero voting rights, if so detailed in the company
charter.'
96
Companies may also issue interest-bearing shares. 197 This
type of share is a modem hybrid, possessing characteristics of
both debt and equity financing. Like debt, interest-bearing
shares earn a rate of interest, as determined by the company stat-
ute, regardless of whether the company has shown a profit. 98
Like equity, such shares may also be entitled to receive divi-
dends. 199 In light of the demands that such financing may put on
a company, these shares may total only ten percent of the entire
company's registered share capital.200 While this share type has
been infrequently used in practice, owners of interest-bearing
shares are entitled to other share-related rights, including the
right to receive dividends and voting rights. ° l' Preferred shares
also could be structured without voting rights to resemble inter-
est-bearing shares.
Varied instruments of debt financing, including convertible
and preference bonds, also are permitted under the Company
Act, although the value of convertible bonds may not exceed fifty
percent of the company's registered capital.20 2 A convertible
bond entitles its holder to convert the bond into equity shares on
terms detailed in the bond itself, an attractive option to the
holder when dividends exceed the bond's interest payments.20 3
A bond ensuring the right of preemption, or preference bond,
gives its holder the option of buying a proportional number of
new shares, if and when issued by the company. 2 4 Apparently,
precluded.") with Gray et al., Poland, supra note 2, at 299 ("A share entitles its holder to
at least one vote at the appropriate meetings.").
195. See Company Law, supra note 181, art. 242(4).
196. Id. art. 242(1). If dividends due on preferred non-voting shares are not paid for
two consecutive years, those shareholders are entitled to voting rights until those divi-
dends are distributed.
197. Id. art. 245.
198. Id. art. 245(2).
199. Id. art. 245(3).
200. Id. art. 245(1).
201. Id. art. 245(3).
202. Id. art. 246.
203. Id. art. 246(1).
204. Id. art. 246(2).
1992] 325
Geo. Wash. J. Int'l L. & Econ.
this type of bond may be exchanged for the new shares, but the
rate of conversion is an open question. While there is not yet an
established practice, Hungarian lawyers read the statute to allow
conversion only at par value, and not market value.
Finally, workers' shares are envisioned by the Company Act.
2 0 5
These shares may be distributed to current employees free of
charge or at a rate lower than the issuing or market price.
20 6
Workers' total shares may not exceed ten percent of the com-
pany's registered capital,20 7 and these shares may be transferred
to other workers and pensioners. 2
0 8
Also worthy of mention are golden shares, which enable the
state to exercise fifty-one percent voting power if it owns at least
one-third of the shares. The original Hungarian Company Law
did allow use of the golden share,20 9 but this provision was subse-
quently deleted. 210 Generally, the golden share is meant to pro-
vide its holder the power to veto certain company decisions, as
indicated in the company statute, that are potentially harmful to
the national welfare. 2 I This privilege is usually reserved for the
government and is most often used by governments in the pro-
cess of privatizing industries considered to be strategic to the
national economy. It enables the government to prevent unde-
sirable parties from taking control, without forcing the govern-
ment to own a full fifty-one percent of the shares. Use of the
golden share by former socialist governments had been looked
upon with suspicion, mainly because it locks in government con-
trol at the expense of a developing market for corporate control.
2. Rights and Duties of Shareholders
Shareholders are entitled to dividends in proportion to their
share value, and, in the event of liquidation, to a proportional
205. Id. art. 244(1).
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id. art. 244(2).
209. See Act VI of 1988 on Economic Associations (Company Act) § 269(3), reprinted
in HUNGARIAN CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, HUNGAROPRESS SPECIAL EDITION [hereinafter
Original Company Law].
210. Company Law, supra note 181, art. 269.
211. For example, the articles of association of Rolls Royce in Great Britain allow the
government to control voting concerning its "nuclear business." In addition, the arti-
cles of the British Airport Authority subject the disposal of airports to the government's
consent. See Cosmo Graham, "All that Glitters. - Golden Shares and Privatised Enterprises,
9 COMPANY LAw. 23, 25 n.7 (1988).
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share of the company's assets.21 2 The distribution of dividends is
left to the discretion of the directors, but dividends may not debit
the registered capital.213 All shareholders may attend the general
meetings, and those holding voting shares may vote either in per-
son or by proxy.214 A simple majority is needed to elect and
recall members of the Board of Directors and the Supervisory
Board, to approve the balance sheet and profit distribution, and
to permit the issuance of convertible or preference bonds.2 15 A
three-fourths majority is required to amend the articles of associ-
ation; modify rights attached to a particular type of share; and
merge, dissolve, or convert the company to another form. 2 16
Because this three-fourths majority is required to make many key
business decisions, investors have in practice sought this level of
control when buying companies privatized through the State
Property Agency.
Hungarian company law protects the rights of minority share-
holders. Minority shareholders are defined as the holders of less
than ten percent of the shares, or a smaller percentage if speci-
fied in the company's charter. 21 7 The minority rights protected
by Hungarian law include the right to call a general meeting, 21 8
to place a specific item on the meeting's agenda, 21 9 and to
request that the Supervisory Board examine management's activ-
ity.220 Any shareholder, member of management, or member of
the Supervisory Board may appeal to the Court of Registration
any decision of the general assembly thought to infringe upon
company law, the articles of association or any other law.
22 1
3. Corporate Governance
All joint stock companies in Hungary must have two layers of
governance-the Board of Directors and the Supervisory
Board-in addition to an outside auditor.222 Although directors
are held to a general duty of care as defined by the Company
212. Company Law, supra note 181, art. 266(2).
213. Id. art. 266(4).
214. Id. arts. 270-271.
215. Id. art. 282.
216. Id.
217. Id. art. 273(1).
218. Id.
219. Id. art. 274(1).
220. Id. art. 275(1).
221. Id. arts. 273(2), 274(4).
222. Id. art. 30.
1992] 327
Geo. Wash. J. Int'l L. & Econ.
Law,22 3 principles of officer and director liability are not yet well-
developed.
The Board of Directors must consist of between three and
eleven members. 224 Conflict-of-interest provisions attempt to
prevent Board members from concluding transactions similar to
that of the company in their own names; from being a partner
with unlimited liability in any company similar to the company;
and from being a leading official in similar companies. 225
The Supervisory Board is charged with controlling the man-
agement of the company226 and overseeing the activity of the
Board of Directors, although the respective competencies of the
two Boards are determined largely by the specifics of the com-
pany's charter. The Supervisory Board must consist of at least
three members, who may. be shareholders or from outside the
company. If the company annually employs an average of 200
employees, one'third of the Supervisory Board must be elected
by the employees. 22
7
B. The Limited Liability Company
Hungary's limited liability company (LLC) is identified by the
letters "Kft" appearing after its name.22 8 As in other CEE coun-
tries, the LLC form is more popular than the joint stock company
among local investors due to its simpler structure and lower capi-
tal requirements. 229 In contrast, many larger foreign investors
choose the joint stock form because it allows for greater ability to
tailor share structure, voting, and other rules to the investors'
particular needs. The LLC is primarily intended as an invest-
ment vehicle for a relatively small group of investors who deal
with each other on a regular basis. During the first quarter of
223. Article 32(1) states that:
Senior officers, supervisory board members and auditors shall be obliged to act
with the care generally expected from persons in such positions. In breaching
their duties they shall be, in accordance with the general provisions of civilian
law, liable for damage caused to the company even if they have a contract of
employment with the company.
Id art. 32(1).
224. Id. art. 285(2).
225. Id. art. 290(1).
226. Id. art. 36.
227. Id. art. 13(1)-(2).
228. Id. art. 155(2).
229. For example, a LLC may be formed by one person. Id. art. 156(1). The mini-
mum capital requirement is HUF 1 million ($11,500). Id. art. 158(2).
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1992, over two thousand limited liability companies registered in
the Budapest Court of Registration.
1. Capitalization
The LLC may be formed by one or more individuals, appar-
ently with no maximum limit.23 0 Its minimum capital must be
HUF 1 million ($11,500), which is lower than that required for
the joint stock company, but still a high barrier for new private
entrepreneurs.2 3' This capital is divided into stakes of a prede-
termined amount. 23 2 Each stake must be at least HUF 100,000
($1150) and exactly divisible by 10,000.233 Parties holding a
stake in the company are referred to as members. One stake may
be held by several individuals, who together are deemed one
member, exercise their rights through a common representative,
and are jointly liable for the obligations of the fiembers.234 Each
member may hold no mbre'than one stake, but the value of that
stake may increase or decrease in proportion to the member's
contribution. 23 5 Contributions may be either cash or in-kind.236
To register the company, at least fifty percent 6f the amount of
each stake must be collected. 237 The rest is payable as deter-
mined by the company's articles of association; cash contribu-
tions must be paid within one year. 238 Members' stakes are freely
transferable to any other member of the LLC, but before being
sold to outsiders they must first be offered to other members, the
company, or someone chosen by the membership. 23 9 These
requirements are absolute, and the article of association may not
230. Id. art. 156. Other European countries impose a maximum limit, such as 50, on
the number of partners in limited liability companies in order to differentiate it more
clearly from the joint stock form and to force conversion to the latter form, with its
stricter capital and information requirements, as the company grows in size.
231. Id. art. 158(2).
232. Id. art. 159.
233. Id. art. 159(1).
234. Id. art. 169(3).
235. Id. art. 169(2).
236. Id. art. 161(3).
237. Id. art. 161(2)
238. Id. art. 161(4).
239. Id. art. 170. This differs from the strict rule found in other European countries
that a stake cannot be sold to outsiders without the express and unanimous permission
of insiders. See NORBERT HORN ET AL., GERMAN PRIVATE AND COMMERCIAL LAw: AN
INTRODUCTION 254 (Tony Weir trans., 1982). What constitutes a valid offer in the LLC
case is somewhat unclear under the Hungarian system. The ability to formulate a tighter
preemption rule under a separate shareholders' agreement is another reason that some
foreign investors prefer the joint stock form.
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stipulate more favorable terms.240 Unlike the joint stock com-
pany, the LLC may not recruit contributors through public
appeal.2
4 '
2. Rights and Duties of Members
Members are entitled to dividends and, in the event of liquida-
tion, assets in proportion to the size of their stakes.242 Voting
rights are determined by the size of each stake; each HUF
100,000 unit entitles its holder to one vote.2 43 Thus, each mem-
ber has at least ten votes, but variations above this minimum may
be determined by the articles of association.2 44 Apart from the
obligation to pay in one's primary stake, members bear no liabil-
ity for the LLC's debts.
LLC members must hold meetings at least once a year.
245
Decisions are passed by a simple majority unless otherwise stipu-
lated in the articles.2 46 Members may, however, pass decisions by
mail without holding a meeting, subject to the normal require-
ments for voting majorities, unless any member requests that a
meeting be convened to discuss the decision.2 47 Minority share-
holders-members who in the aggregate represent at least ten
percent of the current registered capital-may call a meeting of
all members.2 48 As with the joint stock company, any amend-
ment to the company's articles of association requires a three-
fourths majority vote.249
3. Company Governance
The LLC may be managed by one or more directors or manag-
ers, elected to serve a set term of years by members representing
a majority of the company's assigned votes. 250 A Supervisory
Board with at least three members is mandatory for the LLC if
(1) its capital exceeds HUF 20 million ($230,000); (2) its mem-
bership exceeds twenty-five people; or (3) its number of full-time
240. Company Law, supra note 181, art. 172.
241. Id. art. 156(2).
242. Id. art. 177(2).
243. Id. art. 187(1).
244. Id. art. 157(1)(c).
245. Id. art. 183(1).
246. Id. art. 186(1).
247. Id. art. 192(1)-(3).
248. Id. art. 190(1).
249. Id. art. 216(1).
250. Id. art. 197(1).
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employees exceeds an annual average of 200.251 In the last case,
similar to the joint stock company, one-third of the Supervisory
Board members must be elected by the employees. 252 An
independent auditor is required if the company's initial capital is
greater than HUF 55 million ($634,000), or if the company is
held by one person.25 3
C. Partnership Forms
Two common forms of partnership are included in the Com-
pany Act: the general partnership and the limited partnership. 254
In the general partnership, all partners are jointly and severally
liable for the partnership's liabilities. 255 The limited partnership
consists of limited partners, whose liability is limited to their con-
tribution to the partnership, and one or more general partners
whose liability is unlimited. 256 General partnersare responsible
for the active management of the company. Both forms are quite
flexible, as partners are able to negotiate their own arrangements
regarding capital contributions, distribution of profits and losses,
and allocation of voting and managerial rights. 257 As is common
in most CEE countries, Hungarian partnerships are not pass-
through entities and are thus subject to tax at the entity level.
D. Procedures for Setting Up a Company
The first step in setting up either a joint stock company or a
limited liability company is drafting the articles of association,
which must then be signed by all founding members as well as
the company attorney.258 Although the articles must be nota-
rized, this procedure is not as expensive or time-consuming in
Hungary as it is in other CEE countries. 25 9 In Hungary, the job
251. Id. art. 34(l)-(2).
252. Id. art. 13(2).
253. Id. art. 39(2).
254. The Hungarian law uses slightly different terminology when referring to the
two types of partnerships. The "general" partnership is called an "unlimited" partner-
ship, while the "limited" partnership is known as a "deposit" partnership.
255. Id. art. 55(1).
256. Id. art. 94(1). In an apparent effort to protect creditors, the Company Act man-
dates that a natural individual can only be an unlimited liability member of one company
at any given time. Id. art. 6(1).
257. Id. art. 97(1).
258. Id. art. 19.
259. See Gray et al., Poland, supra note 2, at 303-04 (discussing difficulty in finding
notaries and their high fees in Poland).
1992]
Geo. Wash. J. Int'l L. & Econ.
of notaries is not to approve the form of the documents, but
merely to certify that the signatures are authentic.
Within thirty days from the adoption of the articles, the com-
pany must apply to the Court of Registration to register the com-
pany. 260 Its application must include a registration fee equal to
two percent of the company's initial capital, and a certification
from the bank that the initial capital is on deposit.2 6' The regis-
tration process is known to be slow-six months is considered
normal-and cumbersome, although the Court of Registration is
now fully computerized. The delay is caused by the enormous
backlog of applications, mistakes generated by the relative inex-
perience of lawyers filing registrations, and careful court scrutiny
of each application to insure conformity with Company Act
requirements. If provisions do-not comply with the act's formal
requirements, the Court of Registration may return the articles
for changes. As local lawyers gain more experience with the
Company Act, they are beginning to use simpler articles of asso-
ciation that closely track the act's language, the hope being that
fewer applications will be returned for corrections.
The company attains the status of a legal personality upon its
registration in the Trade Register.262 It may then access its bank
deposit and formally begin its activities. In addition, it may now
begin to ratify any actions taken by the founders in the period
between the adoption of the deed and the company's formal
registration.263
VI. FOREIGN INVESTMENT LAW
Since Hungary first opened its doors to foreign investment in
1988, the country has enjoyed a level of foreign investment
unmatched by any other CEE country. 264 This was initially due
to Hungary's original foreign investment law, Act XXIV of
260. Company Law, supra note 181, art. 23(1).
261. ILT CONDITIONS ABROAD, supra note 141, at 7.
262. Company Law, supra note 181, art. 24(1).
263. Id. art. 25(2).
264. As of late May 1991, Hungary had $1.2 billion in foreign capital--over half the
total foreign capital in all of Eastern Europe-invested in 5000joint ventures. Germany
and Austria are partners in approximately 2000 of these ventures, and approximately
40% of this $1.2 billion comes from U.S. investments (fewer in number but typically
larger in size). Most joint ventures are small service and trade operations, employing
only one or two people. Around half of all joint ventures in Hungary have $160,000 or
less invested. Karoly Okolicsanyi, Joint Ventures Begin to Have a Significant Impact on the
Economy, REP. E. EUR., May 24, 1991, at 23.
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1988,265 which was the most liberal investment law in the region
at that time. That law has, however, been modified periodically
since then, but it still retains the basic features that are particu-
larly attractive to foreign investors. 266
A. Ownership and Forms of Investment
Hungarian foreign investment law allows foreign individuals
and entities to own up to one hundred percent of a Hungarian
investment, including the real property associated with it.267 The
forms for such investment are governed by the Law on Economic
Association and include both incorporated firms and branches.
No special permission for foreign ownership is needed.268 In the
event of expropriation, the law guarantees foreign investors full
compensation in the currency of the original investment. 269
B.- Profit Repatriation
While Hungary's currency, the forint, is not yet formally con-
vertible, the foreign investment law does allow foreign investors
to repatriate their forint profits in the currency of the original
investment at the official exchange rate, 270 provided that the
company has the equivalent amount in forint on reserve. 27'
Although this language has been a source of confusion for many
investors, it has generally been understood to mean that profits
must be actually received and deposited in the investor's account
before repatriation is possible. In practice, this means companies
must obtain bank certification that the forints have been depos-
ited. And while the law is unclear on this point, some lawyers'
understanding of the law is that companies may apply for such
certificates only at year's end when the company declares its
265. Act XXIV of 1988 on Foreign Investment in Hungary, reprinted in HUNGARIAN
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, HUNGAROPRESS SPECIAL EDITION (Apr. 1989) [hereinafter For-
eign Investment Act].
266. Law No. XCVIII of 1990 amending Law No. XXIV of 1988 concerning foreign
investments in Hungary [hereinafter Amended Foreign Investment Act] (unofficial
translation, on file with The George Washington Journal of International Law and Economics).
267. See Hanson, supra note 85, at 442.
268. Id. A previous requirement that the Minister of Finance and the Minister of
Commerce approve all foreign ownership that exceeded 50% was repealed in 1990.
269. Foreign Investment Act, supra note 265, ch. I, art. 1.
270. Id. ch. III, art. 32. The foreign investor is also entitled to this repatriation right
if the company is liquidated or the foreign investor sells his interest. Id. Additionally,
foreign officials, members with management duties, and employees have the right to
transfer freely 50% of their taxed personal income. Id. art. 33.
271. Amended Foreign Investment Act, supra note 266, para. 10 (amending chapter
III, article 32 of the Foreign Investment Act).
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annual dividend. Other lawyers, however, argue that profits may
be repatriated at any point during the year, based on an
approved temporary balance sheet, subject to the requirement
that the profits be returned to Hungary if there is a negative
profit balance at year's end.
272
Foreign individuals and companies with foreign participation
are permitted to maintain hard currency accounts in any Hun-
garian commercial bank. 273 Hungarian companies receiving cap-
ital contributions from foreigners in hard currency may also
deposit them in such accounts. 274
C. Tax and Customs Incentives
Hungary's corporate tax rate is currently forty percent,275 but
the foreign investment law offers generous tax incentives to for-
eign investors.2 76 These incentives are industry specific and
depend upon the amount of foreign investment. 277 An annex to
the Foreign Investment Law identifies areas of particular impor-
tance to the Hungarian economy. 278 If a company's sales reve-
nue derived from these activities exceeds fifty percent; the
founding capital exceeds 50 million forints; and the foreign con-
tribution is at least thirty percent, then the company is entitled to
receive a one-hundred percent tax holiday for the first five years,
followed by a sixty percent holiday for the second five years.
279
Other sectors receive smaller tax benefits. For example, com-
panies building or operating a new hotel, 280 with founding capital
272. See George G. Lorinczi, Overview of the Law Governing Foreign Investment in Hun-
gary, CORP. COUNS. INT'L ADVISOR, Sept. 1, 1990, at 64-02, 64-08 (on file with The George
Washington Journal of International Law and Economics).
273. Id. at 64-08.
274. Id.
275. Foreign Investment Act, supra note 265, ch. III, art. 14(2).
276. Id. art. 15(l); Amended Foreign Investment Act, supra note 266, para. 4
(amending chapter III, article 15 of the Foreign Investment Act).
277. Foreign Investment Act, supra note 265, ch. III, art. 15; Amended Foreign
Investment Act, supra note 266, para. 4. The early versions of this law granted an auto-
matic 20% tax cut for companies with either foreign equity of at least 20% or HUF 5
million (U.S. $65,100). See Foreign Investment Act, supra note 265, art. 15(2)(a).
278. Foreign Investment Act, supra note 265, ch. III, art. 15(2)(c). This subsection
cross-references an appendix. The industries listed in the appendix include: electronics,
car parts, machinery, engineering units, pharmaceuticals, packaging technology, agricul-
tural and food technology, energy conservation, telecommunications, tourism, and pub-
lic transportation. Id. app.
279. Amended Foreign Investment Act, supra note 266, para. 4 (amending chapter
III, article 15(2)(b) of the Foreign Investment Act).
280. The hotels covered by this section include not only those constructed by the
company in question, but also renovations that classify a building as a hotel or that
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above 50 million forint and with foreign contributions of at least
thirty percent, receive a sixty percent tax holiday for the first five
years and a forty percent holiday for the second five years. 28' In
addition, taxes are rebated on profits reinvested by the foreign
investor in Hungary.2 82
On the customs side, foreign investors importing capital
equipment will not be charged customs duties if either: (1) the
equipment is part of the foreign investor's contribution; or (2) it
is paid for out of the company's hard currency account.2 83 If,
however, during the subsequent three years the company sells or
leases that equipment, then the company must pay the customs
duty applicable at the time of importation.2 84
Customs-free zones for foreign investors are also envisioned
by the Foreign Investment Act. 28 5 Companies incorporated in
these zones will be exempt from Hungarian customs, excise, and
exchange control regulations, as well as price controls and state
supervisory regulations.2 86 They will be permitted to maintain
accounting systems in fully convertible currencies. 287 Companies
seeking to incorporate in such zones must first obtain approval of
the Ministry of Finance. 288 Customs-free companies have already
been established in certain industries, with special rules on how
the plant is built and operated in order to segregate customs-free
goods.
The generous tax incentives offered to foreign investors in
Hungary have been widely criticized by economists and tax policy
experts.289 In addition to discriminating against domestic invest-
ment, incentives such as tax holidays can cause tremendous reve-
nue loss and severely complicate tax administration.290
Recognizing these problems, Hungary has recently moved to
eliminate these special tax incentives for foreign investments.
upgrade a preexisting hotel to a higher classification. See id. para. 4 (amending chapter
III, article 15(2)-(3) of the Foreign Investment Act).
281. Id.
282. Id. para. 5 (amending chapter III, article 16(1) of the Foreign Investment Act).
283. Id. paras. 7, 9 (amending chapter III, articles 18, 31(3) of the Foreign Invest-
ment Act).
284. Id.
285. Foreign Investment Act, supra note 265, ch. IV, art. 37.
286. Id. ch. IV, art. 38.
287. Id. ch. IV, art. 41(1).
288. Id. ch. IV, art. 40.
289. See generally Javad Khalilzadeh-Shirazi & Anwar Shah, Introduction: Tax Policy
Issues for the 1990s, 5 WORLD BANK ECON. REV. 459 (1991); Anwar Shah & Joel Slemrod,
Do Taxes Matter for Foreign Direct Investment?, 5 WORLD BANK EcON. REV. 473 (1991).
290. See id.
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The incentives are to be restricted- so that they only last a maxi-
mum of ten years and will be available only to companies that are
substantially in production before the end of 1993.
D. Dispute Resolution
The Hungarian foreign investment regime gives substantial
freedom to private investors to choose the mode and venue for
purposes of dispute resolution. Given the relative lack of com-
mercial experience and precedent in the Hungarian legal system,
joint venture agreements often provide for arbitration to resolve
disputes that may arise. At present, approximately half of all dis-
putes are arbitrated through the Hungarian Chamber of Com-
merce, and the other half in various international forums. Apart
from the company's articles of association, which must be gov-
erned by Hungarian law, any other agreement related to the
establishment or operation of ajoint venture may be governed by
foreign law, if the parties choose.2 9 1
Hungary is a signatory to the International Convention for Set-
tlement of Investment Disputes.2 92 Although rarely used in prac-
tice, this convention guarantees a forum in which private citizens
of signatory states may arbitrate their claims against the govern-
ments of other signatory states.2 93 In so doing, it adds an addi-
tional degree of security not found in most other CEE countries.
VII. CONTRACT LAW
The ability to contract freely with others and the assurance that
contracts will be enforced are among the most basic require-
ments of a legal framework for a market economy. The freedom
to contract allows resources to gravitate to their most valuable
use. On the other hand, this freedom often conflicts with other
social concerns, such as protection of the labor force from
oppressive employer policies, protection of consumers from war-
ranty disclaimers, and, more generally, protection of weaker par-
ties from one-sided contracts. Striking a proper balance between
291. For example, Swiss law is commonly chosen to govern shareholders' agree-
ments. Theodore S. Boone, Dispute Resolution and Related Issues in the Context of
Investments in Central and Eastern Europe, presented at the Country Risk Management
Session, ABA Spring Meeting (Apr. 9, 1992) (on file with The George Washington Journal of
International Law and Economics).
292. See Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and
Nationals of Other States, opened for signature Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575
U.N.T.S. 159.
293. Id. ch. I, art. 1(2).
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these competing interests is a primary function of contract law in
market economies.
A. Contracts Under Socialist Law
Contract law in Hungary has been broadly governed since
1959 by the Civil Code and, more specifically, by related com-
panion laws and implementing regulations and decrees. Two
distinct spheres of contractual relations existed during the social-
ist period: the private sphere and the commercial or "economic"
sphere. 294 The private sphere consisted mainly of personal
agreements among individuals, usually for small monetary
amounts or equivalents. For these contracts, the Civil Code was,
and still is, adequate to set a framework for bargaining and
resolving disputes that may arise. 295 These private sphere con-
tracts between citizens, or between citizens and economic organi-
zations, do not differ in essential aspects from similar contracts in
Western market economies, although their scope in the past was
influenced by the economic policies of the state. Most impor-
tantly, the state's policies of restricting ownership of private
property and the means of production were particularly
influential.296
More significant for Hungary's economy were the commercial
or "economic" contracts. These refer to contracts between state
enterprises that were instruments of the state economic plan.
Because state-owned enterprises were expected to fulfill their
production quotas under the state plan, and because the socialist
industrial base consisted primarily of monopolistic suppliers,
state-owned enterprises had little choice regarding with whom
and to what extent they contracted. Thus, inter-enterprise agree-
ments were in essence translations of state economic plan targets
into contractual form. 29 7 If the term "contract" implies bargain-
ing in pursuit of one's own interest, the term "socialist contract"
seems oxymoronic.
The primacy of the plan led to certain aspects of contract law
294. See generally Civil Code, supra note 66.
295. For a thorough and comprehensive analysis of Hungarian contract law under
the Civil Code, see FERENC PETRICK, MINISTRY OF JUSTICE OF THE HUNGARIAN PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC, THE STATUTES OF THE HUNGARIAN PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC: CIVIL CODE OF THE
HUNGARIAN PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC 19-51 (1982).
296. See Gyula E6rsi, General Survey, in VII INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPAR-
ATIVE LAw 3-16 (Arthur von Mehren ed., 1978) (discussing contract law under
socialism).
297. Id. at 9-10.
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unique to socialist systems. For example, there arose a duty to
contract. Although this duty originally applied to specific plan
targets, it seemed to develop into a general duty to conclude eco-
nomic contracts, even when the contract was not part of the
plan. 298 This duty was actionable, meaning that anyone who
breached it could be formally challenged in a precontractual
arbitration.2 99
Similar to Poland, but in contrast to Romania, Hungary specifi-
cally incorporated socialist principles into its Civil Code.
300
Thus, the Civil Code allowed for mandatory conclusions of con-
tracts by statute or ministerial decree;3 0' nullification of contracts
injurious to socialist norms;30 2 modification and conclusion of
contracts by the courts in order to further national economic
interests; 3 03 and definition of the contents of contracts, such as
prices, by legal rule as determined by state arbitration, regardless
of the wishes of the parties.30
4
Until the 1970s, disputes resulting from socialist contracts
were usually withdrawn from the jurisdiction of the courts and
relegated to so-called Decisional Committees, which functioned
more as administrators of the state plan than impartial jurists.
Because contracts were designed to implement the central plan,
and because of the scarcity and monopolization of most
resources, the preferred remedy for breach of contract in a
socialist economy was specific performance. 30 5 Furthermore,
determining the proper level of damages was not as straightfor-
ward, given the absence of market signals. In contrast, monetary
damages are usually the preferred remedy in a market economy,
where the damaged party can typically re-enter the market and
negotiate another contract for the goods or services desired.
30 6
298. Id. at 11.
299. Civil Code, supra note 66, 208(2)-(4); see also PETRICK, supra note 295, at 35-36.
300. See PETRICK, supra note 295, at 19-23. Poland's Civil Code was drafted in 1964,
during the socialist period, while Romania's Civil Code dates from prewar times and was
never amended during the socialist period. The same socialist contract rules existed in
Romania, however, but with an independent legal basis.




305. See E6rsi, supra note 296, at 14.
306. Members of the law and economics movement, most notably Judge Richard
Posner, believe that Western contract law should, in the interests of efficiency, allow a
party to breach a contract when it will be in their economic interest to do so. In other
words, if the promisor believes that his performance is worth more to someone else,
then it is efficient to allow him to breach the contract, provided that he pays the prom-
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Compared to other CEE countries, the Hungarian industrial
sector is generally thought to have enjoyed relatively greater
freedom of contract during the socialist period. Much of this was
due to management reform under the New Economic Mechanism
of 1968, which shifted more decision-making power from the
ministerial level to the enterprise level °3 0 7 Act IV of 1977 signifi-
cantly modified Hungary's contract law by reintroducing the con-
cept of freedom of contract into the commercial sphere. 30 8
While management enjoyed greater independence after the
reforms of the late 1960s and 1970s, enterprise output was still
expected to meet the goals set by the national economic plan.3 0 9
Moreover, freedom of contract continued to be limited by the
scarcity of both investment resources and credit t3 10 Thus, free-
dom of contract was substantially increased, but still did not
approach the freedom found in Western market economies. To
this day, many transactions remain governed by the Contract for
Delivery of Merchandise 3 l" and the Contract for Delivery of Agri-
cultural Produce,31 2 which include many obsolete administrative
requirements and restrictions.
B. Current Status
Commercial transactions in the Hungarian economy are
increasingly being conducted according to the sections of the
Civil Code originally designed for small, non-commercial private
transactions. These sections embody standard, Western notions
of contract theory. They incorporate basic principles of offer,
acceptance, and performance. They provide standard terms for
about twenty-five types of transactions, such as sales contracts
and real estate leases. 313 They also provide legal doctrine to gov-
ern usurious interest rates, bad faith dealing, illegal contracts,
mistake, deception, duress, capacity, and impossibility of
performance. 31 4
isee the full extent of his damages. See, e.g., E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 12.3
(2d ed. 1990) (discussing the theory of the efficient breach); see also Patton v. Mid-Conti-
nent Sys., Inc., 841 F.2d 742, 750 (7th Cir. 1988) (Posner, J.) (supporting same).
307. See generally Popper, supra note 175, at 7-19.
308. Id.
309. Id.
310. See E6rsi, supra note 296, at 3-7.
311. Civil Code, supra note 66, 379-388.
312. Id. 417-422.
313. Id. 365-378, 423-451. See generally Daniel T. Ostas, Institutional Reform in East-
Central Europe: Hungarian and Polish Contract Law, 26J. EcoN. ISSUES 513 (1992).
314. See generally Civil Code, supra note 66, 198-218.
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Because Hungarian courts have little experience with commer-
cial contract cases, the application of these provisions in com-
mercial disputes remains uncertain. Judicial interpretations and
decisions over the coming years will determine the true sub-
stance of contract law in Hungary and just how far the doctrine of




Bankruptcy law serves several related functions in a market
economy. First, it provides a mechanism to liquidate inviable
enterprises and- repay creditor's claims according to some pre-
established rule of priority. Second, in cases of default in which
some or all of the operations of the debtor are potentially viable,
it provides a legal framework through which creditors and debt-
ors can negotiate binding agreements to undertake financial and
real reorganization. In most cases, this reorganization includes
partial liquidation, such as the sale of some of the debtors' assets.
Third, the threat of bankruptcy imposes greater financial disci-
pline on enterprise managers. Hence, bankruptcy laws are
important promoters of industrial restructuring.
It is important to distinguish between two different sets of
potential "users" of the bankruptcy procedures. The first is the
large group of state-owned enterprises that are inefficient and in
need of restructuring or liquidation. For these state-owned
firms, bankruptcy procedures and the threat of liquidation3 1 6 are
thought to provide the motivation to restructure that might not
otherwise exist, due in part to the pro-labor incentives caused by
extensive worker self-management.3 1 7 The second group is the
315. The authors are heavily indebted to Izak Atiyas for his generous and extensive
input into this section.
316. Creditor passivity in initiating bankruptcy cases had been common in CEE
countries, in part because state-owned banks themselves faced "soft budget constraints"
and could in essence count on bail-outs from the government if enterprise debts were in
arrears. To counter creditor passivity, the Hungarian government mobilized the tax and
social security authorities to initiate liquidation proceedings against enterprises which
were in arrears in their tax or social security payments. The effect of this initiative was
limited, because enterprises started to pay their tax and social security obligations to
avoid liquidation. With a similar purpose, the liquidation law was amended to require
enterprise management to file for liquidation whenever a situation of default persisted
for a certain period of time, a measure that has been dubbed "self-bankruptcy."
317. Many Hungarian state enterprises are "self-managed"--managed by enterprise
councils where employment is over 500, or by enterprise assemblies where employment
is less than 500. In these enterprises, restructuring or liquidation can take place only
with the consent of enterprise councils or assemblies. Even though there are excep-
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newly emerging private sector, both enterprises and banks. For
this group, bankruptcy law is part of a wider set of legal rules that
increase the potential for debt collection and thus facilitate the
flow of private credit in an economy. Such credit is essential for
the success of new private businesses. Private sector bankruptcy
law also includes provisions defining legally enforceable security
interests and methods of foreclosure.
Thus serving two "masters," bankruptcy law is as seriously
overburdened in Hungary as it is in other CEE countries. Reor-
ganization and liquidation procedures are expected to play a
major role in solving the systemic problems of enterprises and
banks that carried over from socialism. This may be more than
can be expected; these problems may instead require systemic
solutions outside of bankruptcy law. In contrast, the bankruptcy
process in most market economies works at the margin for a rela-
tively few firms. Such a role is important to the second "audi-
ence" in the CEE countries-the newly emerging private sector.
A. The New Bankruptcy Law
The Law on Bankruptcy Procedures, Liquidation Procedures
and Final Settlement 318 was passed by the Hungarian Parliament
in September 1991. It provides two alternative avenues for
defaulting debtors-reorganization3 1 9 and liquidation.3 20  A
debtor is obligated under the new law to file for bankruptcy,
either reorganization or liquidation, if it is more than ninety days
in default on its debts. 32' Reorganization, or "bankruptcy" in the
official Hungarian translation, did not exist under previous law
and is similar in its purpose to Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy
Code.322 It is a workout-oriented procedure designed to allow
the debtor to achieve a settlement with creditors and continue
operation. The debtor may file for reorganization if it expects
that it will otherwise be forced to default on its debts within a
year, or if it is already insolvent but its creditors have not yet
tions, the managements of these enterprises are widely believed to be unwilling to adopt
restructuring policies that may result in unemployment or actual loss of control.
318. 1991. 6vi IL. t6rv~ny a cs6deljrsr6l, a felszmolsi eljrsr6l 6s a v~gelszmolsr6l
[Law IL of 1991 on Bankruptcy Procedures, Liquidation Procedures and Final Settle-
ment], Hatlyos magyar jogszablyok, Dec. 1, 1991, translated in Nr. II./23. HUNGARIAN
RULES OF LAW IN FORCE 1719 (1991) [hereinafter Bankruptcy Law].
319. Id. ch. II, arts. 15-21.
320. See id. ch. III.
321. Id. ch. II, art. 9.
322. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1174 (1988) (pertaining to reorganization); 11 U.S.C.
§§ 701-766 (1988) (pertaining to liquidation).
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initiated liquidation. 323
During reorganization, the current management remains in
control of the debtor's assets. After the announcement of the
bankruptcy procedure, the debtor is entitled to a ninety-day mor-
atorium on monetary claims other than wages that have become
due.324 Within sixty days, the debtor must prepare a proposal for
reorganization to restore solvency, which must then be approved
by all creditors present at a special hearing. 325 If the proposal is
approved, the court then declares the bankruptcy procedure con-
cluded within fifteen days.3 26
The second procedure, liquidation, can be initiated by the
debtor itself or by a creditor.327 In addition, a reorganization
procedure automatically becomes a liquidation procedure if the
debtor and the creditors fail to reach agreement within ninety
days. 328 During liquidation, the debtor's assets are managed by a
trustee, who is charged with liquidating the debtor's assets and
repaying creditors. 329 However, the debtor may still try to reach
a settlement with its creditors during liquidation. If such a settle-
ment is reached, the liquidation procedure is suspended.33 0 A
settlement is approved only if accepted by half of the creditors
entitled to vote in each class of creditors, and by creditors repre-
senting at least two-thirds of the total claims.331 The law also
contains a "simplified" liquidation procedure for cases where the
value of the debtor's assets is insufficient to cover even the costs
of the liquidation proceedings.3 32 In such cases, assets them-
selves may be distributed to the creditors. 333
The new law is different from the previous one in several
important respects. First, it establishes rigid time limits on the
different stages of the bankruptcy and liquidation process. For
323. Bankruptcy Law, supra note 318, ch. I, art. 3.
324. Id. ch. II, art. 12.
325. Id. ch. II, arts. 15-17. Bankruptcy laws in most countries do not seek unanimous
agreement for the approval of an agreement. In that respect, the Hungarian law is
stricter than most.
326. Id. ch. II, art. 19.
327. Id. ch. III, art. 22(l)(b). Creditors include banks, suppliers, and the social
security fund. Until 1991, suppliers were the most active in petitioning for relief against
debtors; of 528 requests that year, only eight were from banks and five from the social
security fund.
328. See id. ch. III, art. 22(l)(a).
329. Id. ch. III, art. 46.
330. Id. ch. III, arts. 41-45.
331. Id. ch. III, art. 44.




example, following a petition, the court is required to determine
whether to initiate a bankruptcy procedure within fifteen days, 334
an action that under the old system took up to several months.
In the case of petitions for liquidation, the court has to establish
the presence or absence of a default within sixty days.335 As
noted earlier, there are strict time limits on the preparation and
negotiation of a reorganization agreement. The new law also
imposes a maximum of two years for the completion of
liquidation. 336
Second, the law carefully tries to balance the distribution of
control over assets and of bargaining power between a debtor
and its creditors. As indicated above, the management of the
debtor enterprise effectively retains control and therefore has
significant bargaining power during settlement negotiations.
However, two provisions have been introduced to protect credi-
tors. First, creditors may request the court to appoint a supervi-
sor who, while having no management powers, oversees the
financial situation and asset management of the company to pro-
tect the creditors' rights.3 37 Second, the automatic transforma-
tion of reorganization into liquidation in the event a settlement is
not reached inhibits the debtor's managers from delaying the
process or adopting an unduly adamant position during
negotiations.
The third difference is that the new law encourages reorganiza-
tion in lieu of liquidation when feasible, and it tries to encourage
real as well as financial restructuring to make surviving firms
more competitive in the long run. The restructuring agreement
is required to contain "measures likely to result in an increase of
incomes."338  Moreover, the law explicitly mentions that
"[w]ithin the framework of the agreement creditors or third par-
ties . . . may secure ownership rights in the property of the
debtor."3 3 9 Both provisions increase the likelihood that agree-
ments address not only financial, but also real restructuring. The
creditors are also allowed to designate persons to monitor the
debtor's compliance with the agreement. 340 The ability to moni-
334. Id. ch. II, art. 11(1).
335. Id. ch. III, art. 27(2).
336. Id. ch. III, art. 52(2).
337. Id. ch. II, art. 14(2).
338. Id. ch. II, art. 18(l)(a).
339. Id. ch. II, art. 17.
340. Id. ch. II, art. 18(3).
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tor compliance increases the creditors' confidence in agreements
and thereby encourages reorganization.
Despite these positive aspects, however, there are a few areas
where the current law might benefit from further improvements.
An important drawback of the law involves the priority of claims
upon liquidation. Specifically, the claims of creditors secured by
liens on assets have lower priority than claims for wages and sev-
erance payments, which are considered to be liquidation costs.
This provision, a political compromise and a deviation from the
international norm, is likely to dampen the incentives of secured
creditors to initiate bankruptcy, to reduce the role of banks in
enterprise restructuring, and to constrain the development of
secured credit as a financial instrument.
In addition, the rights of dissenting secured creditors in a set-
tlement arranged between creditors and the debtor during the
process of liquidation need to be further clarified.3 4' In particu-
lar, it is not clear whether a dissenting secured creditor retains
the right to exercise its security or whether an agreement can
reduce its claims without its prior consent.342
B. The Law in Practice
The number of bankruptcy filings in the first few months after
passage of the new law skyrocketed. Although the data is some-
what sketchy, the number of filings appears to have increased
from 528 in 1991 to 14,300 in 1992. 34 3 Of these 14,300, 4400
were reorganization ("bankruptcy") filings and 9900 were liqui-
dation filings. Because the law came into effect on January 1,
341. This problem would not arise for settlements reached during reorganization
because these agreements require the unanimous consent of all creditors. Therefore,
any dissenting creditor would be able to block a proposed settlement.
342. For example, consider a secured creditor whose claim is reduced in a proposed
agreement and who does not consent to the settlement. Does that creditor retain the
right to execute the security? Can a settlement remove a security without the consent of
the creditor? The draft law does not provide clear answers to these questions. Different
countries have resolved this issue in different ways. In some countries, such as Ger-
many, the claims of secured creditors cannot be reduced in a settlement. In the United
States, a settlement can be approved despite dissenting creditors if the court decides
that the dissenting creditors are treated fairly and equitably, which for secured creditors
means that they retain their liens on assets and they obtain periodic cash payments equal
to the value of their claims. In the United Kingdom, a settlement cannot be approved if
it affects the rights of a secured creditor to enforce the security.
343. These are filings for liquidations under the old law. Although the number of
filings is monitored, records are not systematically kept on the nature and size of compa-




1992, and requires reporting after ninety days in default, there
was a particular surge of filings in April 1992, including 2259 for
reorganization and 1281 for liquidation. -
For several reasons, the strong pace of filings in Hungary is
expected to continue. First, new banking and accounting laws
are expected to put pressure on the banking system and make
banks more vigilant on debt collection. Second, the new law is
likely to make creditors more willing to initiate bankruptcy, both
because liquidations should be faster and because the new law is
more protective of creditors' rights. Third, enterprise managers
are more likely to initiate bankruptcy under the new regime, as
they are subject to penal sanctions if they willingly fail to do so
when the enterprise is insolvent. Furthermore, they may be more
willing to initiate bankruptcy because of the possibility of reor-
ganization and retention of their jobs in lieu of liquidation.
This surge in cases demonstrates the difficulty of applying the
traditional solution-judicial bankruptcy proceedings-to the
systemic problems of enterprise insolvency in CEE countries. It
is highly improbable that any judicial system, much less one with
relatively little exposure to economic matters, could handle such
a caseload surge both efficiently and effectively. As noted earlier,
the judicial route works best at the margin, but other means may
be needed to handle the large systemic problems, which could
affect thirty to fifty percent of the economy.3 44 Not only are
experienced judges in short supply, but so too qualified trustees.
Especially in cases involving large enterprises, liquidators have to
act as corporate managers and financial managers to preserve the
assets of the enterprise and, whenever viable, to encourage set-
tlements between creditors and debtors. They also need to have
legal expertise.3 45 The Ministry of Finance has recently increased
the pool of liquidators by establishing objective criteria for eligi-
bility and selecting ninety additional liquidators from among
344. Integrated programs of bank restructuring; enterprise restructuring, privatiza-
tion, and liquidation of insolvent state-owned firms-primarily using non-judicial
means-are now under discussion, for example, in Poland and Slovenia.
345. The government is authorized to establish a list of liquidators. Until recently,
the supply of liquidators was provided by six institutions, most of them consulting firms.
However, under Government Decree No 165/1991, individuals can now also be
included in the list of liquidators. Such individuals need to have a degree in economics,
finance or law. Organizations that employ such individuals may also be enlisted. Appli-
cations are judged by a committee appointed by the Minister of Finance and Minister of
Justice.
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numerous applicants. In light of the thousands of cases now
being filed, however, this pool of liquidators remains small.
IX. COMPETITION LAw
The structure and dominance of the public sector throughout
Central and Eastern Europe is now proving to be an obstacle not
only to the development of the private sector, but also to the
improvement of the performance of the public sector itself.
Large, state-owned monopolies are able to impose unfair condi-
tions on private firms, smaller public firms, and consumers. In
essence, private firms are free to thrive primarily in niches not
dominated by the state sector. Because of their power over out-
put and jobs, large state firms act as a powerful lobby to influence
government decisionmaking in fiscal, monetary, trade, and other
matters. For this reason, the breakup and privatization of state
monopolies is essential not only to the growth of a private sector,
but more generally to the development of a stable market econ-
omy. Competition law can be an important tool to encourage
such breakup and to prevent abusive monopolistic behavior.
Hungary should, however, move very carefully in applying its
competition law in order to avoid overzealous enforcement and
the resulting bureaucratic dampening of healthy competition.
Hungary's new competition law, Act LXXXVI of 1990 on the
Prohibition of Unfair Market Practices,3 4 6 took effect on January
1, 1991. The law deals with the traditional areas of antimonopoly
enforcement, including horizontal and vertical agreements
among firms, abuse by a single firm of a dominant position, and
merger control.3 47 Additionally, it established a specialized
antimonopoly office, the Office of Economic Competition, to
enforce these provisions, subject to review upon appeal by the
Budapest district court.3 48 The law also covers unfair competi-
tion and prohibits such activities as misleading advertising and
346. Act LXXXVI of 1990 on the Prohibition of Unfair Market Practices, reprinted in
HUNGARIAN MINISTRY OF FINANCE, PUBLIC FINANCE IN HUNGARY (PERFEKT Fin. Post-
graduate Training Series No. 72, 1991). Hungary's concern with rules of competition
actually began in the late 1960s, with its moves toward decentralized market socialism.
As part of the reforms instituted under the New Economic Mechanism (1968), Hungary
revitalized its original Act on Unfair Economic Competition (Act No. V on the Prohibi-
tion of Unfair Competition of 1923) through numerous governmental decrees. These
rules were updated in 1984 with the adoption of Act No. IV on the Prohibition of Unfair
Business Activities.
347. See id. chs. 3-5.
348. See id. 52.
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"unfair" acquisition and use of business secrets.3 49
On the topic of horizontal agreements, the law explicitly for-
bids agreements among competitors concerning practices such as
price fixing, market division, technological development or the
exclusion of certain consumers or input suppliers3s 0 However,
the standard for evaluating the legality of these arrangements is
the "rule of reason," rather than a per se ban on horizontal cartel
arrangements. 3
51
There are, however, numerous exceptions to the prohibition.
Some of these are specific exceptions, such as agreements
between parties with less than ten percent of the market, 352 and
some are more general, such as agreements that are "aimed at
stopping abuse of economic superiority '" 3 53 or agreements where
"the ... advantages outweigh the ... disadvantages. " 354 Thus,
the law provides a relatively weak restriction and gives the
antimonopoly office and the courts wide discretion in their
review of cases. While this discretion might help the authorities
concentrate scarce administrative resources on certain cases, it
weakens the general deterrence power of the law and could lead
to long, drawn-out arguments on what is or is not a limit on com-
petition. Hungary should consider strengthening the prohibition
on horizontal cartel agreements by adopting a per se approach.3 55
In the area of vertical agreements, a separate section of the law
349. Id. 5.
350. Id. 14(2).
351. Under a rule of reason approach, which proceeds case-by-case, the pro-compet-
itive benefits of a particular practice are weighed against the anti-competitive effects of
that practice. In contrast, a per se approach forbids a particular practice under any and
all circumstances. As the United-States Supreme Court has stated:
There are, thus, two complementary categories of antitrust analysis. In the
first category are agreements whose nature and necessary effect are so plainly
anticompetitive that no elaborate study of the industry is needed to establish
their illegality-they are "illegal per se." In the second category are agreements
whose competitive effect can only be evaluated by analyzing the facts peculiar
to the business, the history of the restraint, and the reasons why it was imposed.
National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978). See also
Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958) (also discussing per se
unreasonableness).
352. Act LXXXVI of 1990 on the Prohibition of Unfair Market Practices, supra note
346, 16(1).
353. Id. 15(a). Paragraph 15(b) also exempts agreements that are deemed to be
"of minor significance" from scrutiny under this law. Id. 15(b).
354. Id. 17(l)(b).
355. The same argument is made in RUSSELL PITTMAN, SOME CRITICAL PROVISIONS IN
THE ANTIMONOPOLY LAWS OF CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE (U.S. Department ofJustice,
Antitrust Division, Economic Analysis Group Discussion Paper No. EAG 91-10, Sept.
20, 1991).
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forbids abuse of any "position of economic superiority" and
includes certain restrictions on vertical agreements.3 5 6 Also pro-
hibited are vertical tying arrangements regardless of the size of
the firms involved.357 It is wise of Hungary to limit its scrutiny of
vertical restrictions to those involving dominant firms, and the
same rule should apply to tying arrangements as well. Economic
analysis in the United States and Europe shows that many vertical
restraints, such as resale price maintenance, refusals to deal, dis-
criminatory pricing, and tying of sales, may enhance efficiency
under certain circumstances-typically when market structure is
competitive and the firms imposing the restraints are not in a
dominant position.358
Hungary's new competition law also prohibits dominant firms
from limiting the access of new entrants to the market.359 This is
extremely important in the Hungarian context if new private
firms are to gain access to inputs and distribution networks.
However, the Hungarians must be careful not to interpret rea-
sonable market behavior, such as buying in bulk, requiring up-
front deposits from purchasers, or raising/lowering prices to
consumers, as anticompetitive conduct. In general, enforcers
should refrain from imposing direct price conditions and concen-
trate more on conditions of access to the market.
With regard to market structure, the Hungarian law empowers
the antimonopoly office to review proposed mergers of large
firms360 and to block any that are deemed to be anticompeti-
tive.3 6 1 As with horizontal agreements, there are exceptions to
356. Any person or firm having over 30% market share is presumed to occupy a
"position of economic superiority." Act LXXXVI of 1990 on the Prohibition of Unfair
Market Practices, supra note 346, 21(1)(c).
357. Id. 9.
358. As a result of this economic analysis, enforcement of U.S. antitrust law has soft-
ened during the 1980s, and the Department of Justice has refused to prosecute many
cases it would have brought in earlier times. See THE BASICS OF ANTITRUST POLICY: A
REVIEW OF TEN NATIONS AND THE EEC 60 (World Bank Industry and Energy Department
Working Paper, Industry Series Paper No. 43, Feb. 1991). The Organization for Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development (OECD) is also recommending that European
jurisdictions relax their laws and look at each case of vertical restraint on a rule of reason
rather than a per se basis. Opponents of the rule of reason approach argue that busi-
nesses need certainty above all, and that this approach leaves too many questions as to
what is permitted and what is not, thereby inhibiting business activity.
359. Act LXXXVI of 1990 on the Prohibition of Unfair Market Practices, supra note
346, 20(d).
360. Firms must notify the office if they jointly have a 30% market share or if their





the rule. Mergers need not be blocked, for example, if the advan-
tages to competition exceed the disadvantages, or if the merger
promotes penetration into foreign markets. 362 Once again, the
agency is given almost unlimited discretion in making this
decision.
One important element missing from the law, however, is the
authority of the antimonopoly office to order the breakup of
large monopolistic firms. This authority should exist, particu-
larly where state-owned enterprises are undergoing privatization.
This nexus between antimonopoly policy and privatization exists
in both Poland and Czechoslovakia, and is a useful tool to inhibit
the privatization of public monopolies into private ones, which
are certainly much harder to control or split apart once in private
hands.
Interpreting and applying the new Hungarian law in an effec-
tive manner is an enormous challenge, particularly given the dis-
cretion that is granted to the enforcement authorities in the law
itself and the broader set of problems with antimonopoly legisla-
tion in general. The enforcement office will need to tread lightly
at first. As well as handling individual complaints, it should con-
centrate on its other important missions: educating the public
about the distortions caused by monopoly behavior and lobbying
the government and Parliament to minimize the barriers to inter-
national trade-the most powerful antimonopoly force of all.
X. JUDICIAL INSTITUTIONS
As in other CEE countries, the judiciary did not play a very
active role in the commercial sector during the socialist period,
and it is currently not well-equipped to take on the sudden
expansion in activity that has emerged from the rapid economic
reforms of the past few years. To accommodate private sector
activities, the judicial infrastructure will need to be upgraded
through training, staffing, and equipment.
A. Court Structure
There are four types of courts in the Hungarian judicial sys-
tem: the Supreme Court, district courts, county courts, and spe-
cial courts. 363 There are about 2000 judges nationwide, with
362. Id. 24(2).
363. The structure of the judiciary is defined by the following authorities: the new
Constitution; Act IV of 1972 on the judiciary; Act LXXX of 1990 on the Establishment
of Local Courts; Act XXXII of 1989 on the Establishment of the Constitutional Court;
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about 200 unfilled positions. Most cases initially are brought in
the district courts, of which there are approximately 102.3
64
District courts have general jurisdiction and can hear criminal,
civil, and commercial cases. 365 Although the district courts are
not divided into chambers, judges do tend to specialize, meaning
that in practice, cases are heard by judges with some experience
in the particular area. Hungary has a fairly unified court system
with only a few separate specialized courts: the Labor Affairs
Courts, the Military Courts, and the Courts of Original
Jurisdiction. 36
6
Appeals from the local courts are made to the county courts. 367
There are nineteen county courts in Hungary, as well as the
municipal court, which serves the Budapest metropolitan area.
This level is divided into three branches: civil, commercial, and
criminal. The Budapest municipal court has a separate labor
chamber. A county court may act as the court of first instance
when the amount in controversy exceeds HUF 3 million
($35,000) (typically seen in disputes between state-owned enter-
prises)368 or in claims related to intellectual property, libel, slan-
der, damages caused by state officials, and certain other matters.
In such cases, appeals may be made to the Supreme Court. 369
The Supreme Court also guides lower courts by issuing advisory
opinions. This judicial guidance role is set forth in the
Constitution. 3
70
Changes in court organization began in 1989.371 In 1990, a
Act III of 1952 on the Code of Civil Procedure; and Act I of 1973 on Criminal Proce-
dure, as amended. Law Decree 23 of 1989 and Executive Decree of the Minister of
Justice govern courts of registration and registration of companies. The 1989 amend-
ment to the Constitution introduced into this system the Constitutional Court, but it is
not formally part of the judicial structure. For a thorough discussion of the Hungarian
judiciary, see Mikki Graves, The Legal System of Hungary, in 8 MODERN LEGAL SYSTEMS
CYCLOPEDIA § 1.4 (Kenneth R. Redden ed., 1991).
364. Graves, supra note 363, § 1.4(C).
365. Id.
366. Id. § 1.4(E)(l)-(3).
367. Id. § 1.4(D).
368. Until 1972, all inter-enterprise disputes were heard by "economic arbitration
tribunals," which settled supply and delivery agreements according to the state plan.
These tribunals were abolished in the 1970s, and inter-enterprise disputes have since
been heard by the commercial chambers of the county courts.
369. Graves, supra note 363, § 1.4(B)(1).
370. See 1989 Constitution, supra note 16, ch. X, § 47.
371. One area under active discussion involves the overhaul of the court structure:
whether a four level court system should be introduced as opposed to a simple modifica-
tion of the current system; and whether the Ministry of Justice or the self-governing
Judicial Councils should be the guarantor of the lawfulness of court procedures.
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new law on the promotion and compensation ofjudges came into
effect. Self-governing Judicial Councils were established to
appoint court officials and to handle internal disciplinary cases.
The latest amendment, Act LXVII of 1991, increases the role of
Judicial Councils in court financial decisions and in the selection
and appointment of judges. The amendment also separates
budget and administration of the Supreme Court from the Minis-
try of Justice; local and county courts remain subordinated to the
Ministry.
The Hungarian judicial system suffers from a shortage of well-
qualified judges, particularly in the newly emerging commercial
areas. Judges are appointed for life by the Hungarian President
and may be removed only for cause.372 They do not enjoy partic-
ularly high status or pay, and over half work on a part-time basis.
Over the past few years, their workload has more than doubled,
due to the registration of new private companies, the rapid rise in
the number of commercial disputes, the rash of new compensa-
tion claims, and growing criminal activity. To alleviate the judici-
ary of this increased workload, the Ministry of Justice sought
unsuccessfully to re-establish the administrative courts, abolished
under the socialist regime, to adjudicate alleged violations of citi-
zens' rights by the state.
One area needing immediate judicial attention is debt collec-
tion. Of the 700,000 lawsuits filed nationwide in 1991, itself a
sixty percent increase from the previous year, two-thirds involved
uncollectible debts. Streamlining debt collection, perhaps by
allowing private debt collection in uncontested cases or reducing
procedural requirements in judicial cases, could relieve much of
the current strain on the courts.
Arbitration could be a useful alternative to court procedures as
a means of resolving commercial disputes among private parties.
As in other CEE countries, the Hungarian Chamber of Com-
merce has an arbitration chamber that specialized during the
socialist period in the settlement of international trade disputes.
The 1988 Act on Business Organization gives this chamber juris-
diction for disputes arising out of a company's organizational
documents, if the parties agree. A broader mandate and proper
technical support could help this body develop into a viable alter-
native forum for dispute resolution. A new draft arbitration law
now under consideration would give access to the Chamber of
372. See 1989 Constitution, supra note 16, ch. X, § 48.
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Commerce's arbitration chamber to anyone doing business in
Hungary.
B. The Legal Profession3 73
Law-Decree 4 of 1983 on the Legal Profession broke the close
ranks of the "legal working groups" and allowed company attor-
neys to compete in dealing with economic organizations. Act
XXIII of 1991 amended the 1983 law to give Hungarian attor-
neys the right to establish law offices with a minimum of two
attorneys, or individual practices. Attorneys working in groups
must transform themselves into law offices. Admission to the bar
requires a law degree, professional exam, Hungarian citizenship,
permanent domicile in Hungary, a clean record, and liability
insurance. Practicing attorneys may not take up other employ-
ment, although they may join the boards of various companies.
Currently, there are about 1200 practicing lawyers in Budapest.
Foreign lawyers can open representative offices and provide legal
assistance on foreign legal matters, but may not practice Hun-
garian law.
XI. CONCLUSION
Hungary has been on the forefront of CEE countries in
reforming its legal framework to promote private sector develop-
ment. It was among the first to make major changes in its Consti-
tution and Civil Code to promote free enterprise and put private
property on the same legal footing as state-owned property. It
moved quickly to establish a Constitutional Court to protect
these legal rights. This court has extremely broad jurisdiction
and has proven very active in reviewing economic as well as social
legislation.
With regard to formerly nationalized property, Hungary is the
only CEE country to eschew widespread restitution in-kind, opt-
ing instead for a coupon scheme that is likely to cause signifi-
cantly less uncertainty and disruption in property markets. It has
basic legislation in place to protect intellectual property and to
provide a clear and flexible framework for the establishment of
domestic and foreign-owned firms. Finally, new and relatively
modern antimonopoly and bankruptcy laws went into effect at
the beginning of 1991 and 1992, respectively.
373. All of the information in this section was obtained through numerous interviews
conducted with various members of the Hungarian legal profession.
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Despite these achievements, however, numerous legal and
institutional challenges remain. The most difficult area, apart
from company privatization, which is not discussed here, remains
real property. The development of efficient land markets contin-
ues to suffer from an inaccurate land registry, an underdeveloped
legal and institutional framework for collateral, the near impossi-
bility of eviction in cases of nonpayment of mortgage loans or
rent, and an outdated and incomplete zoning and regulatory
structure. Further substantive scrutiny is also called for in other
areas of law, most notably bankruptcy and competition.
Finally, the challenge of implementing all of this new legisla-
tion is daunting, particularly given the country's limited experi-
ence with market principles and institutions. Both the
specialized institutions, such as those charged with implementing
intellectual property and antimonopoly laws and with registering
companies, and the regular courts are in danger of being over-
whelmed with a burgeoning caseload. A prime example is bank-
ruptcy, where over 14,000 new cases were filed in 1992 alone.
Another example is antimonopoly law, where the broad legisla-
tive mandate and the relative inexperience of the regulators
could create the potential for counterproductive results. In addi-
tion to training and technical assistance, Hungary should work to
provide widespread dissemination of the rulings of the Office of
Competition and the courts more generally, both to educate the
public and to promote public accountability and oversight.
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